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This thesis deals with the role of data in European competition law. By examining the role of data in 
mergers and acquisitions where the suspected rationale of the buying company is to decrease the 
competition it is facing, this thesis takes a speculative idea and turns it into a testable hypothesis: “is 
competition law equipped to handle the role of data in today’s economy?” The research focuses on 
defining a product market for data, what constitutes market power in that market, and how a 
competitive assessment in a merger review may be influenced by considering to role of data in the deal 
at hand.  
This thesis has shown that a market for data cannot be defined, unless one is satisfied to use a 
hypothetical market for data as an input. Data is nevertheless a highly relevant aspect to consider in 
merger reviews, as the access to, control, or ownership of sources of data are increasingly important 
for companies to compete, and thus a determinant of the market dynamics. This in turn has strong 
impact on the assessment of barriers to entry. However, given the difficulties of ascertaining any 
significant impediments on competition arising from concentrations of data market shares, the exercise 
of establishing a hypothetical market for data as an input appears largely superfluous.  
In light of how particular data is in regards of type and content, and how dependent its value is on the 
capabilities of the entity controlling it, there is a paradoxical element in the Commission’s approach to 
it in competition assessments: the more narrow and specific the Commission tries to define the data, 
the more elusive and enigmatic it will become as the data appears increasingly worthless the closer 
one looks at it. This thesis emphasises the need for a specialised and highly detailed analysis of the role 






Data is information such as facts or numbers that can be used as a help when making decisions. 
Rational agents, such as natural persons or companies, base their actions on information about the 
world they inhabit. In this sense, data has always been significant for decision making, and neither is it 
something new for competition law to handle. However, the role and value of data is changing due to 
technological development and the digitalisation of society.   
The process of creating applications that are known colloquially as “artificially intelligent” is called 
machine learning. This process is enabled by access to data, and entails that the machine is given a 
task such as identifying a certain element in graphic pictures, and enough examples of learning data 
together with the corresponding right answer, for it to be able to deduce an algorithm for finding the 
right answer to new, unfamiliar examples. The amount of data required for this process depends on 
the intended process that the machine should learn, but even seemingly easy applications require large 
amounts of data.  
Vast amounts of data (“big data”) can also be used to create actionable information for businesses, 
either with or without the use of machine learning techniques to achieve the analytical capabilities. An 
example of a business that has patented a machine learning technique to gain insight into consumer 
preferences is Spotify, which uses content data to make predictions of demographic and media 
preferences.1 The same information can also be used on the individual level to offer the listener 
recommendations on music that he or she might like, based on their previous listening history and the 
taste profile of similar users.2 
Data is the raw material of information. Information can be used to navigate the world and ensure 
optimal outcome of one’s actions. Companies that have access to data can make better business 
decisions, or develop powerful new technologies and applications. Therefore, data can be a source of 
competitive advantage.  
As access to or control over data can be a factor that generates market power, and competition law 
prohibits abuse of market power, data can be a concern for competition law depending on the 
behaviour of an undertaking with access to or control over data, or due to the characteristics of the 
market in which the company operates.  
Products and services enabled by data display strong network and feedback effects that make the 
already big become better, and thus bigger, and so forth. Therefore, the barriers to entry in a market 
based on possession of data can become considerable, and companies in possession of large amounts 
of data must be careful to not further exacerbate the situation for potential entrants to the market.  
                                                          
1 See the applied for patent “Systems and methods for generating a media value metric” (patent application no. 
US14218354) and the granted patent “Demographic and media preference prediction using media content data 
analysis” (patent application no. US14208363) for an example of how a company can use data to enhance its 
service or product.  
2 Alex Heath, How Spotify's Discover Weekly playlist knows exactly what you want to hear, Business Insider tech 
news [online], 5 September 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/how-spotify-discover-weekly-works-2015-
9?r=US&IR=T&IR=T (accessed on 27 July 2017) 
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Even where a company considers this and acts in non-abusive ways, company expansion through 
mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) may prove problematic from a competition perspective even if the 
specific transactions does not constitute an abuse in themselves.  
Mergers between companies that may result in lasting damages to competition can be stopped or 
conditioned by the Directorate General for competition within the European Commission (henceforth 
referred to simply as the “Commission”), thanks to the authority given to it by the Merger Regulation 
139/2004/EC (the “Merger Regulation”). The Merger Regulation currently only applies to 
concentrations where the individual or combined annual turnovers of the involved companies exceed 
certain threshold values.  
Recent concentrations of companies have indicated that the traditional approach using a method 
based strictly on turnover fails to fully account for the market consequences of the concentration – 
especially if the companies controls large amounts of data. This has caused a discussion on the 
effectiveness of the current turnover-based thresholds, which in turn has contributed the Commission 
to initiate public consultations with the aim to obtain stakeholder feedback concerning the functioning 
of the current Merger Regulation.3  
The role of data in competition law is not exactly clear, and part of this is due to the problems with 
defining a product market for it. It would be possible to use other criteria than annual turnover for 
determining the scope of the Merger Regulation, such as for instance market shares. With a market 
definition for data, this could mean that more mergers aiming at acquiring data would become subject 
to review in regards of their impact on the market.  
Beyond the hypothetical possibility of using a market share-based threshold to determine the scope 
of the Merger Regulation to include such data-centric mergers, the concept of market definition is 
important for all fields of competition law:  
“Market definition is a tool to identify and define the boundaries of competition between 
firms. It serves to establish the framework within which competition policy is applied by 
the Commission. The main purpose of market definition is to identify in a systematic way 
the competitive constraints that the undertakings involved face.”4 
Therefore, beyond enabling a potential new dimension of merger control, the concept of a 
market definition for data could also be meaningful for carrying out other competition 
assessments where data plays an important role.  
1.2. Purpose and research questions 
The purpose of this thesis is to show how a definition of the product market for data could be achieved, 
and to analyse the consequences such a definition would have on a typical merger control.  
This purpose builds on an implicit assumption that European competition law is in its current form not 
capable of capturing the recent developments brought by digitalisation, and the new economic 
                                                          
3 European Commission; 2017; Consultation on Evaluation of procedural and jurisdictional aspects of EU 
merger control; Information: public consultations, last update 7 October 2016; 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2016_merger_control/index_en.html (accessed 3 July 2017) 
4 Commission notice on market definition [1997] OJ 372/05, para. 2 
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complexities this has resulted in. By fulfilling the abovementioned purpose, the validity of this 
assumption will also be made clear at least in regards of the scope of this thesis.  
This thesis will analyse how transactions involving data rich companies is assessed in the European 
merger control, and how this assessment would be impacted on by using the market for data itself as 
the starting point for the analysis of the merger’s compatibility with the competition on the market. In 
particular, the effects on the market dynamics and consumer welfare will be analysed in this regard. 
The vehicle for doing this will be to perform a general competitive analysis of concentrations involving 
the control or ownership of data.  
By making the competitive analysis general – i.e. not confined to a specific scenario – some precision 
and depth will be lost in the analysis, but on the other hand, the analysis can be more theoretical and 
consider most of the unique characteristics of data as a competitive asset. In regards to the purpose 
of this thesis and the lack of preceding literature, the benefits of a general approach outweigh those 
of a case-based approach.  
The research questions are summarised as follows:  
1. how can a market for data be defined; 
2. how is data important in merger reviews (how does it confer market power);  
3. does it make any difference if there is a definition of a market for data; and  
4. is competition law currently capable of fulfilling its goals in the digital economy?  
The competitive analysis will as such include a market definition, an investigation of how to assess 
market power, and what effects on competition a concentration might have. The thesis will be 
structured according to this sequential order, but with the interjection of a chapter that describes the 
nature of data as a competitive asset. 
1.3. Method and material 
This thesis is concerned with European competition law, which consequently determines the methods 
and materials used. In this section I will discuss how European competition law can be examined with 
an approach that examines European law in itself, competition law itself, and finally the amalgamation 
between the two. 
Due to the main body of this thesis being centred around the fields of European competition law, the 
main methodological discussion will be about just that. In my discussion, I will argue that European 
competition law can be reduced to its constituent parts of competition law and European law, and 
studied in detail respectively. To describe the method I have used in this thesis, I will begin with 
describing the fundamental conditions of studying European 
law in general, before moving on to describing what 
methodology is warranted for studying the field of 
(European) competition law. Included in the scope of 
methods that are useful for understanding competition law 
are the interdisciplinary method and the comparative legal 
method. Lastly, in the concluding part of the thesis when 
addressing research question four, an analytical legal method 
will be used.  
Structure of this section: 
• Introduction 
• European law in general 
• Competition law in general 
• European competition law 
• Interdisciplinary method 
• Comparative method 
8 
 
Before moving on, a few words on terminology could also be of use: the terms competition law and 
competition policy should not be used interchangeably. For the sake of this thesis, competition policy 
is to be understood as “the set of policies and laws which ensure that competition in the market place 
is not restricted in a way that is detrimental in society”5 – i.e. policy is a broader category than law, 
and can also include the category of law. Competition law on the other hand denotes all rules that 
have legal authority or relevance, which for the sake of this thesis is limited to the jurisdiction of EU 
law.  
1.3.1. Understanding European law, in general 
The method used in this thesis is a traditional dogmatic legal method, where authoritative sources are 
consulted to determine what the law is. For this work, the authoritative sources are mainly decisions 
from the European Court of Justice (the “ECJ”) or the Commission and soft law. In addition to these 
two types of authoritative sources, the method will also involve a number of academic articles, which 
I do not consider to be authoritative legal sources within the Union law. All three sources will be 
discussed sequentially, below. 
As a Swedish lawyer, interpreting ECJ decisions is somewhat more complicated than interpreting 
national court decisions or legal sources. There are mainly two reasons for this: the fact that dissenting 
opinions are not allowed in the decision (meaning that a consensus must be reached by all the judges 
in a case),6 and that there is no master version of the 28 different language version that each decision 
results in.7  
For the sake of this work, as the Commission’s conduct and decisions under a merger review are 
subject to the judicial review of the ECJ,8 I will use the same method for interpreting decisions from 
both the bodies. Furthermore, the composition of the ECJ (and Commission)9 is that of high-profile 
experts with academic – not necessarily legal – credentials, and the “tone” of the decisions can be 
rather technical and academic.10 When interpreting the decisions, I will use a teleological approach 
that seeks to extract the sense of direction which the decision (or statement within) points to and 
isolate the principle that possibly can be found. As the decisions are products of compromise, this must 
                                                          
5 The definition is taken from Massimo Motta, Competition policy - Theory and practice, Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 2004, p. 31  
6 Julia Laffranque, Dissenting Opinion in the European Court of Justice — Estonia’s Possible Contribution to the 
Democratisation of the European Union Judicial System, Juridica International, IX, 2004, p. 16 
http://www.juridicainternational.eu/public/pdf/ji_2004_1_14.pdf (accessed 20 March 2017); Michael Bobek, 
The Court of Justice of the European Union, in The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law, A Arnull & D 
Chalmers (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 13 
7 The multilingual problem is discussed in depth in the following doctoral dissertation, which finds that the larger 
languages within the Union usually weighs more heavily in a case of interpretation than what the smaller 
languages do, and that the multilingual interpretation in practice is about “ticking the box” of checking both the 
English and French version: Mattias Derlén, A castle in the air: the complexity of the multilingual interpretation 
of European community law, PhD Diss., Department of Law, Umeå University, 2007; for a summary, see 
http://www.mynewsdesk.com/se/umea_universitet/pressreleases/eg-raett-paa-flera-spraak-skapar-
foervirring-146307 (accessed 24 March 2017) 
8 European Commission, Merger Control Procedure, last update 13 August 2013, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/procedures_en.html (accessed 20 March 2017) 
9 The current structure and staff of the Directorate General for competition can be seen here: European 
Commission; Directorate-General for Competition, last update 1 June 2017, 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/directory/organi_en.pdf (accessed 11 July 2017) 
10 Bobek, p. 13 
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be accounted for in all deductions made from a decision: there can often exist a more extreme version 
and a less extreme version of the teleological direction that have been argued for before the consensus 
was reached.  
As for the 28 different language versions, I will only use English material in this thesis as I will not go 
into the level of depth where an A/B-comparison between language versions will be necessary. Also, 
in regards of the merger decisions that are analysed, it is clearly stated on the cover page that only the 
English version is authentic and that it should take precedence over all other versions. 
As a final remark regarding the ECJ – which despite its obviousness still warrants mentioning – the ECJ’s 
decisions must be interpreted in the light of them being relevant for all 28 Member State legislations, 
and as such held on a more or less general and abstract level. Being as it is that I am a Swedish lawyer, 
it is unavoidable that I have anything but a Swedish legal perspective on the European law.11 However, 
in CILFIT,12 the ECJ states that national courts are obliged to interpret the Union law in relation to the 
context of the Union law in its entirety, with due consideration for the purposes of the Union law and 
at what point of development it was when the rule in question was applied. In Björnekulla,13 the ECJ 
stated that national authoritative sources of interpreting how a directive should be applied are 
trumped by European authoritative sources of interpretation, if these contradict the national ones. 
The main area of inquiry in this thesis is the European competition law and not (any) national 
competition law – therefore the main challenge for me is not to handle the relationship between 
national and European legislation, but to adopt the thinking of a supranational legislator which must 
per definition be more theoretical and abstract than that of the national legislator.  
As for soft law, the administrative authorities within the Union give rise to large volumes of policy 
documents, notices, guidelines, etc., which form a considerable body of so-called soft law. Soft law is 
not binding legislation, but can still have a normative effect on how Member States apply Union law. 
The ECJ have declared that national authorities may be obliged to consider soft law as data for the 
interpretation of how Union law should be applied.14 Therefore, the various reports and policy 
documents from the EU that are used in this thesis should be considered to have a rather high level of 
legal standing if they are relevant for a case at hand.  
An academic paper has no standing as an authoritative legal source as such, but the arguments put 
forth therein can serve as the basis for arguments made within the legal discourse. As for this thesis, 
which deals with matters of competition law that to a large extent chronologically lies ahead of the 
Union rather than behind it, the borders between competition law and policy will seem as pretty 
diffuse. The way I see it is that competition policy affects how the current and future competition law 
                                                          
11 When using a EU method it becomes very important to keep in mind what levels of context there are, since it 
is possible to think of EU law as consisting of two layers: one that is international in character, and one consisting 
of 28 national legislations. In a theoretical context, there is little or no clear answers as to what the EU legal 
system really is – is it international law or national law? Or something in between? Even if the latter was claimed 
in Van Gend en Loos, it begs the question what the EU legal system really is. This duality introduces the question 
of whether the Union law should be studied as 28 different Union laws (i.e. the relationship between the Member 
States’ national legislation and the Union legislation should be studied individually), or whether the Union law 
should be attributed with enough mass so that it can be studied in its own right: Jane Reichel, EU-rättslig metod, 
in Juridisk Metodlära, Fredric Korling & Mauro Zamboni (eds.), Studentlitteratur, 2013, pp. 109-110 and 128 
12 C-283/81 Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health 
13 C-371/02 Björnekulla Fruktindustrier v Procordia Food, para. 13 
14 C-322/88 Grimaldi v Fonds de Maladies professionelles; for more information about soft law in the EU, see: 
Reichel, pp. 121 and 128 
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will be constructed, and that competition policy draws its input from mainly the field of academic 
discussion. As such, the opinions presented in the articles and academic works cited in this thesis will 
be held as important for mainly the competition policy, and therefore, indirectly important for the 
competition law.  
1.3.2. Understanding competition law 
Competition law requires that other material than only texts with legal authority be used, as the legal 
assessment must be based on a firm understanding of the business reality in which the undertaking in 
question operates.  
Unlike many other fields of law, in the realm of competition law it is seldom easy to discern what acts 
and facts have significance for the legal assessment – only in the obvious cases of e.g. collusion about 
dividing the market might the handshake or contract itself constitute such an act or fact of legal 
importance. When it comes to abuse of market power it can be hard to discern exactly what constitutes 
it. Whilst a case of tying and bundling may be easy to identify, what about e.g. foreclosure of the 
market when it is done indirectly and by using the dynamics of the market itself to create the 
foreclosure, as can be the case in a merger? 
To identify a competition problem or market distortion from behind one’s desk, however, one must 
understand the dynamics of the market in question and the rationales for the companies’ business 
decisions. As such, a wide range of relevant material should be used to attain this understanding. I 
attempt to do so, by having the material used in this thesis include inter alia papers by economic 
scholars, news reports, and any other publication which might contain clues to the motives of the 
companies in question.  
1.3.3. Understanding European competition law 
Competition law as a legal field is unique in that it is exclusively concerned with the effects on the 
market and the consumers. The main sources of European competition law are TFEU articles 101 and 
102, respectively on prohibited horizontal and vertical agreements; and prohibited abuse of 
dominance; and in addition to these two articles, the Merger Regulation.  
“The fundamental objective of EU competition rules is to prevent distortion of competition. This is not, 
however, an end in itself. It is rather a condition for achieving a free and dynamic internal market and 
is one of several instruments promoting general economic welfare.”15 
In economics, consumer welfare is the difference between what consumers would have been willing 
to pay for a good and what they actually had to pay.16 Keeping prices to a minimum is therefore one 
of the main objectives with competition law, but it also considers factors such as quality of the 
                                                          
15 The European Commission, Why is competition policy important for consumers? [online], 16 April 2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consumers/why_en.html (accessed 26 July 2017) 
16 Svend Albæk, Consumer Welfare in EU Competition Policy Svend Albæk Consumer Welfare in EU Competition 
Policy, in C. Heide-Jørgensen, C.Bergqvist, U. Neergaard and S.T. Poulsen (eds.), Aims and Values in Competition 
Law , DJØF Publishing, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/publications.html (accessed 19 
July 2017), p. 70 
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products, the range of choice between products, and the level of innovation that companies must 
display to compete for market shares.17  
Given its concern with the effects on the market’s functioning, the ECJ and Commission employs a 
technique that can be referred to as the “counterfactual technique” (or method). This means that a 
“what-if” approach is used to assess the effects of a given situation. The use of this technique has 
initially been confined to merger cases only (i.e. “what would happen if we allowed this merger to 
proceed?”), but it has later spread to all areas of European competition law – as an example, 
counterfactual reasoning is discussed in various guidelines to the application of TFEU art. 101 and 
102.18 
The counterfactual method can be divided into ex ante control (merger control) and ex post scenarios, 
which includes inter alia investigation under TFEU art. 101 and 102 to show anticompetitive effects, 
consumer harm, and calculating damages in litigation.19  
The general field of inquiry in this thesis (the role of data in competition) can be said to belong to the 
realm of ex ante scenarios – in other words, we find ourselves in a time of change and transition where 
it is hard to fully understand what constitutes cause for what effect. Therefore, trying to define a 
competition policy must include an element of speculation. Merger decisions concerning companies 
reliant on data is an important part of this thesis, as they deal with ex ante control – i.e. “what are the 
effects that can be expected if we do this?”.  
However, the narrow field of inquiry in this thesis (market definition and market power in the data 
market) are most likely to be treated ex post by the ECJ, as the effects triggering the legal investigation 
must precede the legal reaction to it – in other words, a potential problem per art. 101 or 102 triggers 
an investigation to be initiated. One example of this would be the recent decision from the Commission 
to fine Google for its abuse of its dominant position in online search services.20 As such, it is important 
to be aware of this tension between forward-looking and backwards-looking decisions, and one must 
be careful when using legal sources that are forward-looking (merger control decisions) to make 
arguments regarding backwards-looking scenarios (abuse of dominance), or vice versa.  
As argued by Geradin and Girgenson, the ECJ has shifted from an originally “form-based” approach in 
its application of competition law to an “effect-based” approach that relies on a counterfactual 
method, which is also evident from the guidance paper from the Commission issued in 2008.21 It has 
also been argued that the reform of the European merger control in 2004 moved the merger control 
away from a structuralist analysis towards a more effects-based analysis.22 
                                                          
17 The European Commission, Why is competition policy important for consumers?  
18 The idea of a “contrafactual method” is discussed in depth here: Damien Geradin, Ianis Girgenson, The 
Counterfactual Method in EU Competition Law: The Cornerstone of the Effects-Based Approach, 11 December 
2011 
19 Geradin and Girgenson, p. 2 
20 Press release, Antitrust: Commission fines Google €2.42 billion for abusing dominance as search engine by 
giving illegal advantage to own comparison shopping service, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
1784_en.htm (accessed 25 July 2017) 
21 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive 
exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ 45/7, para. 21 
22 Carles Esteva Mosso, The Contribution of Merger Control to the Definition of Harm to Competition, [online] 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2016_03_en.pdf (accessed 10 July 2017), p. 2 
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Merger control works with counterfactuals, and the standard counterfactual is the status quo ante – 
i.e. the order of things as they were before the would-be event in question took place. This 
counterfactual was however recognised as not always being the most relevant, as it is sometimes 
necessary to take certain future events into consideration – one such example would be to consider 
the likelihood that a firm would go bankrupt in absence of the merger (known as the failing firm 
defense). This dynamic approach has subsequently been expanded to other situations than the failing 
firm, 23 such as probable business events (Lufthansa/SN Airholding; Lufthansa/Austrian Airlines) or 
probable business actions of companies such as downsizing presence in a market (EDF/Segebel).  
The subject matter of this thesis, which is the value of data and by conjecture the changes of society 
as it becomes increasingly digitalised, can surely be held as a force of change that is relevant for all 
layers of the European Union. Additionally, as discussed above, it is evident that merger review is 
acceptant of considering future counterfactuals based on the current dynamics in motion. 
Nevertheless, the difference between using company-specific counterfactuals and societal 
counterfactuals is considerable, and to argue for a method which considers the latter would be to 
stretch the tolerance of dynamics in merger control to its extreme, in my opinion.  
European merger control is open to consider counterfactuals based on current market dynamics. 
These dynamics have been confined to relatively specific cases. Therefore, when constructing a theory 
of harm – something which can be viewed as the benchmark against which a concentration’s impact 
on the market is measured against – the level of scope of what dynamics can be considered when 
defining the relevant counterfactual makes it harder or easier to prove the theory of harm: if all 
manner of unbridled speculation is allowed, consumer harm can be proven in almost any situation.  
An important methodological consideration in this thesis will then be to define an acceptable level of 
what dynamics are considered as influencing the counterfactual – or in other words, what level of 
speculation is acceptable.  
1.3.3.1. Interdisciplinary method 
In order to understand the context in which the legal analysis will be concluded, I will use an 
interdisciplinary method (mainly in chapter 3) that uses sources of information that are not traditional 
legal sources. This involves studying macro and micro economic considerations of data in modern 
businesses and economies. The sources have been found by searching on the internet for the relevant 
key-words and concepts (such as for instance “input for production”), and digging through sources 
until a trustworthy citation is found, which I subsequently look up and use as a source. The quality of 
a source is mainly determined by how many times it is cited and how recently it was published, but 
factors such as where it was published and by whom may also be considered.  
1.3.3.2. Comparative method 
With the purpose of providing contrast to the European competition policy, and to serve as inspiration 
for arguments about competition law or policy, some examples from American antitrust law will be 
used. Given the limited scope in which the comparative examples will be used, and that no comparison 
per se between Antitrust law and European competition law will be made, I will not make any claims 
to make the Antitrust law particular justice in regards of observing methodological rules that are 
                                                          
23 Geradin and Girgenson, p. 3 
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mandated within the system itself.24 For the sake of this thesis, I am content to note that the American 
and European legal systems are – in addition to their differences in form – reliant on different 
theoretical outlooks on the free market, and to let this be the main caveat for any and all uses of 
comparative outlooks. 
1.4. Some short words about theory 
The purpose with competition law is fundamentally to control a capitalistic market to ensure that it 
helps generate the best possible society to live in. How this is done best is determined largely by what 
theoretical economic approach one uses to explain how the market is best regulated.  
1.4.1. Ordoliberalism and the market 
The ordoliberal theory of economics holds that the market cannot be left to its own accord, and that 
it needs the intervention of the state to help create a legal environment that makes the market create 
the results that are closest to its theoretical potential. The early competition law of the European Union 
was influenced by both American anti-trust law (which held greater confidence in the self-rectifying 
power of the free market) and ordoliberalism. The latter was subsequently subjected to much criticism 
due to it creating an overly formalistic competition law that was prone to protect competitors rather 
than competition itself.25  
However, I personally agree with the idea that the market cannot be left to its own accord if one wishes 
to see it function at its fullest potential – therefore the question becomes that of how much the market 
should be governed vis á vis left to its own functioning. As it is possible to prove that monopolies 
generate both allocative and product inefficiencies, as well as being dynamically inefficient due to it 
having little incentive to develop new technologies, it can be concluded that the market forces alone 
are not guaranteed to “fix it all”.26 
Ordoliberalist theory accepts that states intervene on the market. A key concept in this thesis is deeply 
connected with the level of accepted paternalism by states: given the discernible dynamics in business 
and society, is intervention warranted? Connecting to the discussion above in the method section, I 
believe that ultimately the accepted level of “speculation” (i.e. how much the counterfactual can rely 
on dynamics and change) is determined by one’s opinion of whether the state is capable of knowing 
better than the market what is best for society.  
1.4.2. Competition law and politics  
It is worth remembering that the European Union is inherently a purely political project. One of the 
notable characteristics of its competition law is the safeguarding of the integration of the internal 
market – this has mostly led to a focus on countering territorial restrictions that undermine the 
creation of a single market. However, other policy attributes have also been considered, such as 
                                                          
24 This is can be considered to be ”good enough”: Sandgren C., Rättsvetenskap för uppsatsförfattare : ämne, 
material, metod och argumentation, 3rd ed., Norstedts juridik, Stockholm, 2015, p. 55  
25 Carl Martin Gölstam, Konkurrensrättens Grunder, Iustus, Uppsala, 2013, pp. 44-45 
26 Motta presents the main considerations having to be made in regards of the market in the second chapter of 
his book, and convincingly argues that it cannot be left to its own accord. Motta argues that very often incumbent 
firms are able to maintain and reinforce their market power due to their size, pp. 39-88 
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environmental concerns, investment, transportation, social agenda, regional development or other 
industrial policies.27  
There are indications that the European competition law is becoming increasingly politicised, as 
national politicians, members of the European Parliament, and Commissioners are becoming more 
prone to give their views on how competition law should be applied. Examples of this includes the 
French competition authority criticising the Commission, Angela Merkel’s vouch of approval of the 
Telefónica/E-Plus merger, and the proposed commitments of Google in regards of its shopping 
service.28 
Scholars of critical legal theory argue that law is not an apolitical and objective structure, and that our 
view of what is rational or incoherent, authoritarian or politically tilted are formed by contemporary 
social and philosophical thought.29  
This thesis is not intended to argue for any certain development of competition law, but merely to 
explore the situation it is facing with respect of data. My understanding of the tendency towards 
politicisation of the competition law, together with a critical understanding of the law’s constructed 
nature, will be supressed throughout the main body of the thesis and saved for the concluding critical 
discussion or research question 4: if competition law is capable of fulfilling its goals.  
1.5. Delimitations 
This thesis will study European competition law, and use examples from national legislations only as 
an input for discussion. Examples from American anti-trust legislation will be used, as data and 
antitrust has been a topic of discussion also in that legal context, but otherwise no comprehensive 
comparative effort between European competition law and American antitrust law is made in this 
thesis. 
This thesis will not explore alternative dimensions of consumer harm, such as that consumer harm 
could arise from data protection issues and individuals’ right to privacy under the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, nor that environmental concerns could be a source of consumer harm.  
In the domain of merger review, remedies and ancillary restraints will not be covered, as they add a 
level of complexity that is only relevant for specific cases but have little bearing on the theoretical main 
concepts that are discussed in this thesis.  
Due to constraints in the format of this thesis and the supranational nature of the internet (as it looks 
today), the question of the relevant geographical market for data within the EU will not be discussed. 
I will conduct the following analysis under the assumption that the relevant geographical market for 
data is the entire EU, as there are no infrastructure barriers and otherwise negligible barriers to 
transport and trade, such as language and localised data protection rules. 
                                                          
27 Ariel Ezrachi, Sponge, Journal of antitrust enforcement, 1 March 2006, pp. 5-6 
28 The cited source is from 2014, but the commitment of displaying three links to competitor’s stores still stands: 
Alfonso Lamadrid de Pablo, Of Politics and Competition Law (and on the Google cases too), Chillington 
Competition [blog], 14 July 2014, https://chillingcompetition.com/2014/07/14/of-politics-and-competition-law-
and-on-the-google-cases-too/ (accessed 27 July 2017) 
29 James Boyle, The politics of reason: critical legal theory and local social thought, University of Pennsylvania law 
review, vol. 133, no. 4, April 1985, pp. 689-690 
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1.6. Literature review 
Concerning the economic properties of data, it has – to the extent of my knowledge – not been the 
study subject of theoretical economics concerned with competition. Literature on how companies can 
leverage profit from (big) data is abundant, but a deeper investigation into how data functions as an 
economic resource is scarce. Dominique Foray’s “The economics of knowledge” deals with knowledge 
as a resource, and the ideas presented there can in many regards be transposed to the sphere of data. 
On the other hand, digital platforms and multi-sided markets have been studied extensively, and much 
literature on the subject can be readily found. Among the prominent names in the field are Carl Shapiro 
and Hal Varian, authors of many articles and the book “Information Rules”, that applies traditional 
economic theories on information based technologies. As the book was written in 1999, it is somewhat 
dated due to technological progress, but the core reasoning in it still holds true. The OECD report of 
2015, “Data-Driven Innovation: Big Data for Growth and Well-Being”,30 provides much detailed 
information about the current state of the data economy and has served as a foundation for my 
understanding of the conditions under which companies that relies on data operates.  
In Europe, data and competition policy has also been investigated, and this has resulted in a number 
of documents which has come to be very useful for this thesis, as they both provide numbers and 
figures that are recent and trustworthy, but also give insight into the discussion at the highest policy 
level. These documents will be discussed in the following relevant sections of the thesis.  
As for data and competition law, it has seen lively discussion in a broad sense of the last couple of 
years in regards of whether data poses any new problems for competition law, and if the existing 
competition law framework is equipped to handle cases that involves data as an important factor. The 
discussion has not resulted in any academic works of considerable weight and impact, more than that 
of journal articles. In the American discussion, the question of whether data fits into competition law 
at all is not so very clear,31 whereas in the European discussion there is more consensus that data has 
an important place in competition law, but it is not entirely clear exactly which place and role it has. 
The literature will be discussed continually within the thesis. 
Two theses for masters of laws that have meritoriously explored the role of personal data and data 
protection principles in competition law are “Personuppgifter som valuta i den digitala ekonomin” (En: 
“Personal data as currency in the digital economy”), by Victoria Volny, and “Commercial use of data 
and the implications to merger control in data related markets” by Elisa Salmela.  
In the European discussion of data and competition law, a postdoctoral researcher at the Centre for IT 
& IP Law (CiTiP) of KU Leuven stands out as an authority – her name is Inge Graef. Her academic 
contribution to the field of data and competition law is in my opinion not paralleled within the EU by 
any other singular person, and several of her articles have provided inspiration and guidance for this 
thesis, mostly so her award-winning paper on “Market definition and market power in data: the case 
                                                          
30 OECD, Data-Driven Innovation: Big Data for Growth and Well-Being, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2015 
31 Joe Kennedy, The Myth of Data Monopoly: Why Antitrust Concerns About Data Are Overblown, Information 
Technology & Innovation Foundation, March 2017, http://www2.itif.org/2017-data-competition.pdf (accessed 
13 July 2017); Allen P. Grunes & Maurice E. Stucke, No Mistake About It: The Important Role of Antitrust in the 
Era of Big Data, the antitrust SOURCE, April 2015, 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/apr15_grunes_4_22f.authcheckd
am.pdf (accessed 13 July 2017) 
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of online platforms”.32 It is my hope that my thesis can be said to successfully develop some of the 
ideas initially expressed by her, and provide an expanded and elaborated approach to the market 
definition and market power of data. 
What this thesis hopefully contributes to the academic discussion is a preliminary indication of how 
data in the field of competition law could be understood, and what place and role data has in 
competition law. More specifically, this thesis will also provide a structured discussion of the role of 
data in European merger control.  
1.7. Terminology and glossary 
In this thesis, Data is technology neutral and refers to factual information that includes both useful 
and irrelevant or redundant information, which can be used as it is or have to be processed to be 
meaningful.33 In practice, the word will be used almost exclusively to refer to data in digital form. Data 
will be treated as a mass noun (like water and information are) and not as the plural of datum – hence, 
singular verbs will be used instead of plural.  
The European Union / Union / EU are used interchangeably and all refer to the same transnational 
legal entity that came into being with the Lisbon treaty of 2009, and also includes the European 
Community that preceded it. 
Competition law refers to the rules of legal authority that govern how companies may compete on the 
free market. 
Competition policy is a wider term than competition law, including it as well as also policies and other 
documents that seek to ensure that the free market operates in an optimal way and is not detrimental 
to society.  
Personal data is a legal term used in all member states of the European Union, that is defined in the 
Personal Data Directive 95/46/EC. It has been discussed much in legal doctrine, and the definition and 
case law around it has evolved in relation to the technological progress in general.34 The definition 
gives that every piece of information relating to an identified or identifiable physical person is personal 
information, where an identifiable person is one that can be identified either directly or indirectly, in 
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, 
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.35 This means that for instance referring on 
an internet page to various persons and identifying them by name or other means, such as by giving 
their telephone number, information on their working conditions or hobbies, constitutes personal 
data.36 Lately, it was also determined by the ECJ that IP addresses of individuals may constitute 
                                                          
32 World Competition 2015, 38(4) 
33 This definition is based on the Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary’s definition of “data”: Merriam-Webster, 
data, 2017, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/data (accessed 4 March 2017) 
34 As an example of the plasticity of the term, see for instance: the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
Opinion 4/2007/ on the concept of personal data, 20 June 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2007/wp136_en.pdf (accessed 23 March 
2017) 
35 The Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), art. 2(a) 
36 C-101/01 Lindqvist, Court’s summary paras. 1-6  
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personal data, even if it is necessary to obtain data from a third party to cross reference the IP-number 
in order to identify the person.37 
Non-personal data is data that is not considered as personal data. Personal data can be turned into 
non-personal data through the process of anonymization or pseudonymization.38 
Machine-data is generated by machines, and is non-personal data.  
Big data – a practice of combining vast volumes of information and analysing it to enable better 
informed decisions, which relies on the increasing ability of technology to support the collection, 
storage and ability to analyse data.  
Data Economy – an ecosystem of different types of market players such as data holders, researchers 
and infrastructure providers that collaborate to ensure that data is accessible and usable. This enables 
the market players to extract value from this data, such as by creating applications for traffic 
management or for optimising harvesting.39   
An Input is used in the production of goods and services in order to make an economic profit. An input 
is also known as a factor of production, which can be divided into several categories, of which capital 
is one.40  
An Output is in economics the “various useful goods or services that result from the production process 
and are either consumed or employed in further production”.41 In this thesis, the word “output” will 
be used in a broader sense than the strictly economical, meaning that “output” refers to anything 
produced – such as both a physical output from production or the information produced by a 
computer.42  
2SP – an acronym denoting a “two-sided marketplace”, which is a platform that caters to two or more 
distinctive groups of customers. Often one customer group subsidies the other group’s use of the 
service.43 
1.8. Disposition 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters and two appendices. The reason for this disposition is that 
the appendices were originally part of the thesis, but at the stage of editing deemed to digress too 
much from the legal discussion. Since they are still valid and useful for understanding the subject 
matter, these parts were omitted from the main body of text and added as appendices instead. 
                                                          
37 C‑582/14 Patrick Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Court’s Summary para. 1 
38 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – “building a European data 
economy”, COM(2017) 9 final, 10 January 2017, section 3.1 
39 ibid, section 1  
40 Paul A. Samuelson, William D. Nordhaus, Economics, 19th ed., McGraw-Hill / Irwin, New York, 2010, p. 9; see 
also: Investopedia, Factors of Production, 2017 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/factors-production.asp  
(accessed 4 March 2017) 
41 Samuelson and Nordhaus, Economics, p.9 
42 Merriam-Webster, output, 2017, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/output (accessed 4 March 
2017) 
43 Jean-Charles Rochet, Jean Tirole, Platform competition in two-sided markets, Journal of the European 
Economic Association, vol. 1, n. 4, June 2003, pp. 990 - 991 
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Readers of this thesis should feel free to omit the appendices, as doing so will in no way hamper the 
understanding of the subject matter of this thesis.  
The subject matter of the chapters will be as follows:  
Merger review procedure and the potential competition problem: in this chapter the framework of 
merger reviews are presented, and the notion of data as a concern for competition law and policy will 
be introduced. A theory of harm will be constructed to be used as the benchmark for finding any 
competitive harm.  
Understanding (big) data and its importance for the market: to be able to discuss market dynamics 
as the basis for a counterfactual scenario to be used in the ex ante merger review, the business logic 
of data must be understood. This chapter will bring present the fundamental aspects of data in a digital 
economy.  
Defining the relevant product market for data: the need for, pre-conditions for, and possible method 
for defining a product market for data will be discussed in this chapter.  
Assessing market power in markets for data: the assessment of market power in markets for data, or 
digital economies, will be studied in this chapter. This chapter will also discuss the need for defining a 
market for data, or if an analysis of market power is possible to perform without such a definition, and 
would be sufficient in its own.  
Competitive assessment: the theory of harm will be tried here, in relation to the findings of the 
previous chapters, with the use of the official guidelines of how to apply the Merger Regulation.  
Conclusions: in this chapter the results of the competitive assessment will be summarised, and the 
results of the thesis will be discussed in relation to the research questions posed. The “final remarks” 
helps put the considerations of this thesis into a context of European growth and development policy. 
This chapter also includes suggestions for further research.  
2. Merger review procedure and the potential competition 
problem  
“Community jurisdiction is therefore founded, first and foremost, on the need to avoid the 
establishment of market structures which may create or strengthen a dominant position, and not on 
the need to control directly possible abuses of a dominant position.”44 
A concentration that is within the scope of the Merger Regulation shall be appraised by the 
Commission.45 A concentration is a lasting change in control as a result from inter alia M&A.46 The 
scope of the Merger Regulation is based on thresholds of annual turnover of companies.47 
Concentrations that would significantly impede effective competition on the internal market shall be 
                                                          
44 Case T-192-96 Gencor Ltd v Commission, para. 106 
45 Merger Regulation (139/2004/EC) art. 2 
46 Merger Regulation (139/2004/EC) art. 3 
47 Merger Regulation (139/2004/EC) art. 1 
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declared incompatible with it,48 and can be stopped from happening altogether or allowed subject to 
conditions and/or obligations of the companies involved.49 
When a concentration is within the scope of the Merger Regulation the Commission shall be notified. 
The Commission can also be notified when the concentration does not fall within the scope of the 
Merger Regulation, as a sign of good faith.50 After a notification, a phase 1 investigation is initiated 
where the concentration is either cleared (potentially subject to conditions/obligations) or prohibited 
from proceeding. If the concentration still raises competition concerns, the Commission opens a phase 
2 investigation, which is an in-depth investigation on the concentrations effect on competition.51 
2.1. Is possession of or control over data relevant for the functioning of the 
market?  
In this section I will argue that data may be of value to companies in ways that are not visible with 
traditional economic tools, such as balance sheets. I will argue for this claim and present what 
legislative measures that have already been taken to describe the value of data, and examine how 
effective they can be expected to be.  
As proposed by a joint report on competition law and data by the French and German competition 
authorities, the role of data in economic activities can be subdivided into three main categories:  
1. data may be used to improve existing products or services; 
2. data can create new business opportunities altogether, where new products and services may 
exist; and  
3. data may enable more target-oriented business models (individualised advertising, services or 
products).52 
In this thesis, the type of data that will be examined will be useful from two main perspectives: the 
first is data about consumers which may be used for personalised advertising; and secondly data which 
may be useful as an input for machine learning. Nothing stops the same data being used for both 
purposes.  
The essence of the field of inquiry in this thesis is that the economic value of data may not be evident 
on a company’s balance sheet, even though it may hold great commercial promise as an enabler of 
competitive products and services.  
The prime example that illustrates the above, and the need for an overview of the Merger Regulation’s 
threshold rules, is the acquisition of WhatsApp by Facebook. Since WhatsApp had a relatively small 
turnover at the time of the acquisition (mostly owing to it offering its service to consumers free of 
remuneration), but held a considerable share of the market for direct messaging, the concentration 
fell short of the transaction thresholds of the Merger Regulation. Only thanks to national rules in Spain, 
where market share is also a threshold parameter for notifying national competition authorities of the 
                                                          
48 Merger Regulation (139/2004/EC) art. 2.3 
49 Merger Regulation (139/2004/EC) art. 8.1 and 2 
50 Merger Regulation (139/2004/EC) art. 4.1 
51 European Commission, Merger Control Procedure, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/procedures_en.html (accessed 5 July 2017) 
52 Atorité de la concurrence, Bundeskartellamt, Competition Law and Data, 10 May 2016, pp. 8-11 
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merger, could the merger be submitted to the Commission for review by using article 4.5 in the Merger 
Regulation.53 The supposed rationale for Facebook’s USD 19 billion bid on WhatsApp was the potential 
of combining the two companies data sets to offer better targeted advertisement services.54 This 
shows how a transaction which concerned a large number of consumers directly, in terms of privacy 
concerns, and indirectly due to the strengthening of a market dominant, was close to not have been 
tried at all had it not been for Spanish national rules on merger thresholds.  
Other examples of transactions involving data that failed to meet the turnover thresholds and as such 
were not referred to the Commission includes Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram and Google’s 
acquisition of Waze.55  
The notion that the merger rules needs to be updated so that they can address concentrations 
involving data as a competitive asset is also supported by the Competition Commissioner Margrethe 
Vestager herself:  
“[] it's possible that in other cases, data could be an important factor in how a merger 
affects competition. A company might even buy up a rival just to get hold of its data, even 
though it hasn't yet managed to turn that data into money. We are therefore exploring 
whether we need to start looking at mergers with valuable data involved, even though the 
company that owns it doesn't have a large turnover.”56 
The role of data in competition law has already been recognised nationally in Germany, which has 
recently updated its competition law to better address “big data issues”. This is done by using a 
transaction value-based threshold model (as opposed to a turnover-based model which is used in the 
Merger regulation), which would mean that more concentrations would be nationally reviewed under 
merger rules. The update also includes a specification of what constitutes market power in the context 
of big data.57 The German law deals with the Gordian knot of assessing the transaction value by using 
                                                          
53 COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, para. 1; Eleonora Ocello, Cristina Sjödin and Anatoly Subočs, “What's 
Up with Merger Control in the Digital Sector? Lessons from the Facebook/WhatsApp EU merger case”, European 
Commission Merger Briefs, vol. 1, 2015, p. 2; Enrique Medina, Facebook/Whatsapp: Competition analysis in the 
new Digital Economy, Telefonicá: public policy blog [online], 15 January 2015, 
https://www.telefonica.com/en/web/public-policy/blog/article/-/blogs/facebook-whatsapp-competition-
analysis-in-the-new-digital-economy (accessed 3 July 2017); Osbourne Clark, Could small companies with Big 
Data be caught by EU merger control?, insights [online], 7 October 2016, 
http://www.osborneclarke.com/insights/could-small-companies-with-big-data-be-caught-by-eu-merger-
control/ (accessed 3 July 2017)  
54 European Commission - Press release, Mergers: Commission fines Facebook €110 million for providing 
misleading information about WhatsApp takeover. However, the Commission had already assessed this 
eventuality and dismissed its significance owing to the considerable overlap of the network of the two services: 
COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, para. 140 
55 Ocello, Sjödin, Subočs, p. 2 
56 Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager in her speech Big data and competition, given at the EDPS-
BEUC Conference on Big Data, Brussels, 29 September 2016, 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/big-data-and-
competition_en (accessed 1 July 2017). 
57 Werner Berg, Lisa Weinert, “Transaction-value merger threshold soon to be in force in Germany – update on 
the 9th ARC revision”, Kluwer Competition Law Blog [online], 7 April 2017, 
http://kluwercompetitionlawblog.com/2017/04/07/transaction-value-merger-threshold-soon-force-germany-
update-9th-arc-revision/ (accessed 3 July 2017) 
21 
 
the consideration paid in return for the transaction as the indicator of transaction value,58 which is 
seemingly efficient and capable of capturing the most prominent data transactions – the real impact 
of the update remains to be seen, however. One argument against such a transaction value threshold 
is that relative values differ across industries, meaning that setting an arbitrary transaction value 
threshold may create burdensome effects for some sectors whilst allowing others to escape from the 
intended scrutiny.59 This indicates that a threshold value determined by market shares may be better 
suited.  
As will be further described below, data may be a “hidden” parameter in a transaction where the target 
of the acquisition in fact could be a potential competitor to the acquiring party, even if its balance 
sheet does not indicate so. Furthermore, as there is currently no developed market for data,60 it 
becomes close to impossible to assess the acquisition’s impact on the market in terms of foreclosure 
of inputs (i.e. data) which is necessary for downstream products if one is required to calculate the 
economic value of the data involved in the transaction – something which can be very hard to 
objectively measure.  
Yet still, even if a major overhaul of the European merger rules were to magically take place overnight 
and a threshold based on market shares would be instituted, how would the market shares in question 
even be calculated if there is no discernible market for data? The lack of alternatives to the turnover-
based threshold model makes it difficult to lead a constructive discussion of improvements to the 
European merger legislation in regards to the economic transition into an increasingly digital world.  
An attempt at defining a market for data will be made in the following chapter 4, which will be 
preceded by chapter 3 which describes the nature of data as an economic asset, and its role and 
dynamics in a digital market.  
2.1.1. Acquiring data, or pre-emptive M&A? Or both? 
A possible means of getting access to data is to acquire the company holding the data. OECD reports 
that in sectors related to data, the numbers of M&A deals have increased from 55 deals in 2008 to 
almost 164 deals in 2012, displaying a growth rate of ca 300 % over four years.  
Existing companies are pressured to innovate in order to not lose market shares, as they fear that a 
competitor will bring forth an innovation that can disrupt the current market and make the incumbents 
obsolete or of little interest. An easy way to minimise the risk of a competitor doing so, while at the 
same time adding to one’s own data-dependent innovative capabilities, is to buy innovative companies 
                                                          
58 The ninth amendment to the Act against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen), Section 35  
59 Gavin Bushell, EU Merger Regulation Reform: No Smiles from the Threshold, Kluwer Competition Law Blog 
[online], 24 October 2016, http://kluwercompetitionlawblog.com/2016/10/24/no-smiles-from-the-threshold-
eu-merger-control-reform/ (accessed 27 July 2017) 
60 In a study of the distribution of data sharing models, made by Deloitte on the behalf of the Commission, a first 
classification of the main aspects of data sharing has been established. It states that in 78 % of the cases, data is 
generated and analysed in-house. The data is not traded with third parties, but used for vertical integration or 
for e.g. enhancing the efficiency of internal processes or for improving client service. Of the remaining 22 %, 2 % 
are accounted for by open data sharing practices (e.g. “data philanthropy”), and 20 % by more or less well-
developed markets (e.g. financial data): Commission Staff Working Document – on the free flow of data and 
emerging issues of the European data economy (accompanying the document Communication – Building a 
European data economy), SWD(2017) 2 final, Brussels, 10 January 2017, pp. 14-15 
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with access to data when they are still small but has started to show promise of delivering an innovative 
product or service. Therefore, camouflaged in the increasingly growing stream of M&A concerning 
data might be instances of “pre-emptive” M&A with the double aims of securing the incumbent buying 
company’s position in the market as well as getting access to the target company’s data.   
As Margrethe Vestager puts it: “[o]ne of the simplest defences against innovation is to buy up rivals 
that create innovative products.”61 
Aside from eliminating the risk of being disrupted, the acquiring companies will not only enjoy benefits 
both from economies of scale and scope, but also from the chance of adding the acquired companies’ 
user base to that of its own (and thereby increase the size of the network).  
It is possible that the difficulties with licensing data is a contributing factor towards this: there is no 
coherent legal framework for working with data as a business asset like other conventional business 
assets, and the transaction costs for completing a data “license” deal are considerable. Also, to a larger 
extent than with IPR-licenses, data “licenses” face a larger risk that the source of data may dry up or 
become unusable for some other reason (such as e.g. regulatory change or due to the actions of the 
data collector). Therefore, buying the data collector altogether becomes an alternative to “licensing” 
data that is often more favourable to data-dependent companies. For more information about the 
legal tools for making business with data, please see Appendix 2.  
2.2. The competition analysis 
After the Commission has been notified of a concentration the Commission starts its review. The 
appraisal aims at finding if the concentration is compatible with the common market, considering the 
need to maintain and develop effective competition in the market, taking into account the structure 
of it and the potential competition from new entrants. Furthermore, not only is economic and financial 
power considered, but also – inter alia – access to suppliers, users and other barriers to entry that 
defines the market. Concentrations which would significantly impede the functioning of the market 
shall be not approved, and in particular when the concentration would strengthen an already dominant 
position.62  
The undesirable consequences on the market is further described in two guidelines on the assessment 
of mergers, depending on whether they can be said to be horizontal or non-horizontal.  
Horizontal mergers include companies that are actual or potential competitors on the same market,63 
whereas non-horizontal mergers include the two categories of “vertical” and “conglomerate” mergers. 
Vertical mergers involve companies operating at different levels of the supply chain, and conglomerate 
mergers are between companies that are in a relationship which is neither horizontal (as competitors 
                                                          
61 Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, Competition: the mother of invention, European Competition 
and Consumer Day, 18 April 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-
2019/vestager/announcements/competition-mother-invention_en (accessed 27 July 2017) 
62 Merger Regulation (139/2004/EC) art. 2 
63 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03), para. 5 
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in the same relevant market) nor vertical (as suppliers or customers), which for instance includes 
producers of complementary products in the same product range.64 
The assessment of the impact on the market of horizontal mergers focuses particularly on mergers 
which may result in elimination of competitive restraints (non-coordinated effects) or an increased 
likelihood that companies may coordinate their behaviour (coordinated effects).65  
The assessment of the impact on the market of non-horizontal mergers generally focuses on 
foreclosure of input which would lead to an increase in price on downstream markets, which 
significantly would impede potential competition.66 
The first step of the Commission’s appraisal is often to define the product market and geographical 
market that is relevant for the concentration. After this, the competitive effects of the concentration 
are analysed.67 This latter step of the appraisal is known as a SIEC test (significant impediments to 
effective competition), which can be said to be an effects based, equilibrium based approach that takes 
the relevant market characteristics into considerations.68 In other words: it assumes that normally the 
forces exerted by companies and consumers have settled the market into a state of equilibrium, and 
that changes within this system upsets the equilibrium – if the change is big enough to change the 
equilibrium to a state where consumers are harmed, the change is deemed to have a significantly 
impeding competitive effect, and can as such not be cleared under the Merger Regulation.  
2.2.1. Constructing a theory of harm 
When performing the SIEC test, the Commission needs to find evidence that the concentration is not 
compatible with the market. This is a forward-looking analysis that considers ex ante scenarios, thus 
dealing with the counterfactual.69 The Commission does not need to find evidence that the anti-
competitive effects will happen, as it is sufficient that it is likely that they will happen. This is 
problematic, as proving that future events will happen is nigh impossible, but showing that they are 
likely to happen invites speculation, which means that it is hard to find a realistic middle way.   
Over the last decade, a change in the Commission’s methodology have become evident: it has put a 
greater emphasis on the need for a “theory of harm” to guide the appraisal of the merger. This has by 
some been seen as a significant improvement in the enforcement of competition law, as the presence 
of a theory of harm imposes a logically consistent approach to the assessment of anticompetitive 
behaviour. By making the theory of harm explicit, the Commission has less opportunity to engage in 
                                                          
64 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 265/07), paras. 3-5 
65 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03) para. 22  
66 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 265/07), para. 47 
67 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03) para. 10 
68 Lars-Hendrik Röller Miguel de la Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger Control, 
The European Commission, 22 January 2006, available here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/new_substantive_test.pdf (accessed 5 July 2017), p. 18 
69 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03), para. 9 
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inconsistent or speculative competition concerns, as the articulated theory of harm would serve as a 
backdrop upon which poor arguments would be exposed.70 
A theory of harm should have the following characteristics, according to dr. Hans Zenger and dr. Mike 
Walker:  
• it should articulate how competition and, ultimately, consumers will be harmed relative to an 
appropriately defined counterfactual;  
• it should be internally logically consistent;  
• it should be consistent with the incentives that the various parties face; and  
• it should be consistent with (or at least not inconsistent with) the available empirical 
evidence.71 
The starting point of formulating a theory of harm should then be to define the event that would lead 
to the counterfactual. For the sake of this thesis, the somewhat general and diffuse event is that a 
company which is dominant on the market (either for data, or other products or services) acquires a 
company that is small but holds a large amount of data. The theory of harm will be further developed 
below, following a discussion of what harm such an event could lead to. 
2.2.1.1. Consumer harm 
When it comes to consumer harm, the axiom in competition law is that consumers enjoy low prices 
and are suffering harm if they face higher prices (than what is necessary). In addition to prices, choice 
between alternatives is also a factor, as is high quality products and access to innovation.72 However, 
to properly assess consumer harm according to the diffuse counterfactual mentioned in the previous 
section, one must know which one of the companies is facing the consumer and what products and/or 
services are being offered. Furthermore, as is often the case with data-generating products or services, 
they are usually offered to consumers free of monetary payment– therefore, the risk that consumer 
harm would occur due to increases in price is very low as it would be incompatible with the business 
models of the companies involved to start charging money for their products or services. High market 
shares are not eo ipso incompatible with the functioning of the market, and there is typically a trade-
off to be made between overall economic efficiency and consumer benefit when dealing with 
companies that have a big market shares.73  
In terms of data protection, the Commission has effectively separated competition law from privacy 
law in its decision in Facebook/WhatsApp.74 For the sake of this thesis, I will not explore other avenues 
                                                          
70 Hans Zenger and Mike Walker, Theories of Harm in European Competition Law: A Progress Report (February 
22, 2012), in Ten Years of Effects-Based Approach in EU Competition Law, Jacques Bourgeois & Denis Waelbroeck 
(eds.), pp. 185-209, Bruylant, 2012, p. 2 
71 ibid, p.1  
72 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03), para. 8 
73 Peter Davis, Elina Garcés, Quantitative techniques for competition and antitrust analysis, Princeton University 
Press, 2010, pp. 29 and 123-124 
74 COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, para. 164. An interesting sidenote here is that one could also consider 
environmental interests in this question, which the ECJ have already done. Whilst it is not a current explicit 
purpose of competition policy, it is possible to imagine that it in the future becomes one, even though it might 
arguably be better to use other areas of policy to achieve these goals. See Motta p. 27-28 for more information. 
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of possible consumer harm than those mentioned above: choice between alternatives, quality, 
innovation, etc. 
The consumer harm that is most likely to occur would be related to the products and services: that 
they are of low quality, that there is no wide selection of them, and that there is no innovation. If data 
can be used to improve existing products and services or enable completely new ones, as indicated 
above, is it put to best use in the hands of the few rather than the many? The main concern for the 
consumers in regards of data mergers seems to be their access to innovation. 
2.2.1.2. Innovation as competition concern  
The framework for merger control in regards of innovation is built upon three principles: contestability, 
appropriability, and synergies.75 
Contestability means that the markets need to allow for competition within them. Appropriability 
means the extent to which a company can capture value created by its innovation and protect the 
competitive advantage with it (i.e. the use of IP-strategies and so forth). Synergies means that 
combinations of complementary assets for engaging in R&D will enhance the ability to innovate (in our 
case, the access to data would be such a complementary asset).76  
2.2.1.3. The theory of harm for this thesis 
My proposal for a theory of harm to guide this thesis is that consumer harm could arise due to a lack 
of innovation, caused by concentration of data into the possession of a few dominant actors. The harm 
to the innovation would be caused by markets becoming incontestable and that potential entrants 
become deprived of resources that would generate synergies that would allow them to compete on 
the market. This would lead to lack of alternatives for consumers, less qualitative products due to lack 
of competition, and a lack of innovative products and services built on data.  
The incentives of the dominant companies would be that they want to secure their own position and 
avoid being disrupted by new actors, as well as add the capabilities and resources of the acquired 
company to that of its own. The incentives of the (founders of the) acquired companies would be more 
varied, but should consist of motifs such as a) being acquired is a sign of personal and/or professional 
success; b) being acquired usually enables more resources to develop the company’s idea; c) the 
alternative to accepting an acquisition offer could be undesirable and not viable as an option as the 
company would not realistically be able to compete with the dominant incumbents, and in the worst 
case suffer less-than-friendly behaviour from them.77 
                                                          
75 DG Comp discussion paper, EU merger control and innovation, Competition policy brief [online], April 2016, 
available here http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2016/2016_001_en.pdf (accessed 6 July)p. 2  
76 Ibid: these three principles are proposed by Carl Shapiro as a way of uniting the two opposing theories of 
innovation and competition argued by Joseph Schumpeter (“creative destruction”) and Kenneth Arrow 
(“competition by innovation”) 
77 For examples of such bullying behaviour, see the case of the price comparison service “Foundem”, and its legal 
battle against Google which started as early as 2010: Charles Arthur, Foundem accuses Google of using its power 
to favour own links, The Guardian [online], 30 November 2010, 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/nov/30/google-foundem-ec-competition-rules (accessed 1 
July 2017) – this legal battle led to the recent decision issuing Google a €2.42 billion fine 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1784_en.htm accessed 6 July 2017). Another example is the story 
of Facebook allegedly “bullying” a startup founder’s project: Adrienne Jeffries, Developer has no regrets after 
angry letter to Zuckerberg goes viral, The Verge [online], 3 August 2012, 
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As for consistency with the empirical evidence, the conditions for obtaining such evidence will be 
explored in the following chapters and discussed in Chapter 6 (Competitive assessment). 
3. Understanding (big) data and its importance for the market 
In this chapter I will describe the characteristics of data to provide a better understanding of the 
subject and bring readers unfamiliar with the characteristics of data up to speed (i.e. readers that 
already are familiar with the big data industry should feel free to skip this chapter, similar to the 
appendices). After this, the market definition for data will be analysed in its own chapter, followed by 
a discussion of how to assess market dominance in data-centric industries. Finally, the competitive 
effects that are possible from concentrations of data-rich companies will be discussed. 
3.1. Data as an economic resource 
In this section, I will try to explain how data can be made useful as an economic resource, and briefly 
outline how data is discussed in the contemporary academic and business discussion. This includes 
discussing the contemporary buzz-word “big data”. In my own opinion, the addition of the adjective 
big to data is unnecessary and warranted only by hype-makers wishing to underline that data now 
(suddenly) has commercial properties that it did not previously have, but since the idea of big data has 
become de facto adopted in both the academic and business discourse, it will be used also in this 
thesis.  
Big data is not necessarily a technology, but rather the result enabled by advancements in many 
different technology fields, such as computer storage and processing capabilities, and the power to 
transmit larger sets of information at ever increasing speeds. The European Data Protection Supervisor 
have described big data as not a thing in itself, but as a practice of combining vast volumes of 
information and analysing it to enable better informed decisions. This practice relies on the increasing 
ability of technology to support the collection, storage and ability to analyse data.78 
The term big data says nothing about the content of the information which constitutes the big data. 
Some of the sources of it are the following: it can be auto-generated log files from machines,79 often 
called “raw machine-generated” data; it can be created by various kinds of users themselves when 
they enter usernames and passwords along with other details, in order to access web services; it can 
                                                          
https://www.theverge.com/2012/8/3/3216313/dalton-caldwell-facebook-developer-letter-mark-zuckerberg-
app-net (accessed 1 July 2017). 
78 European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion 7/2015, Meeting the challenges of big data - A call for 
transparency, user control, data protection by design and accountability [online], 19 November 2015, 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/201
5/15-11-19_Big_Data_EN.pdf (accessed 20 February 2017), p. 7 
79 As an indication of the magnitude of data generated, on a flight from New York to Los Angeles with a two 
engine Boeing 737, 240 terabytes of data are generated from the engines alone: Stacey Higginbotham, Sensor 
Networks Top Social Networks for Big Data, Gigaom, 13 September 2010,  
https://gigaom.com/2010/09/13/sensor-networks-top-social-networks-for-big-data-2/ [accessed 2 March 2017] 
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be created by logging said users’ actions on said web services; and it can be created by combining or 
analysing different existing sets of data so that new sets are created.80  
A common way of describing big data is by alluding to three dimensions of information: volume, 
velocity and variety (“the three V:s”). It has been suggested that this definition be improved upon by 
adding the caveat that big data also requires technology and analytical methods for its transformation 
into value.81 
Just as the term big data is neutral in regards of what kind of information it is composed of, the term 
is also neutral in regards of how it is used. One way of structuring the value “cycle” of big data is by 
dividing it in three phases: 1) data collection; that leads to 2) data analysis; which in turn enables 3) 
decision making (to be further discussed in 3.2, The big data value chain).82 At large, data can be help 
to improve a company’s product or service, or enable the company to explore new business 
opportunities.83  
An alternative to step 3) is that data is a requisite for machine learning. The amount of data required 
for developing a narrow artificial intelligence using machine learning varies, but generally a 
considerable amount is needed.  
Many different metaphors have been used to describe big data in ways to make it understandable for 
policy makers and legislators, such as for instance by referring to big data as a “new currency”, or as 
the “oil of the internet”.84 Another interpretation of big data is offered by the OECD, who alongside 
with others argues that it should be viewed as an infrastructure.85 
                                                          
80 For more information about the sources of big data, this article offers a good meta-study of studies concerned 
with big data: Andrea De Mauro, Marco Greco and Michele Grimaldi, “A formal definition of Big Data based on 
its essential features”, Library Review, Vol. 65 Issue 3, pp. 122 – 135. For numbers on sources of big data, they 
can be found here Big Data & Analytics Hub, Where does big data come from?, IBM, 
http://www.ibmbigdatahub.com/infographic/where-does-big-data-come (accessed 2 March 2017) 
81 A thorough discussion about the definition of big data can be found here: Andrea De Mauro, Marco Greco and 
Michele Grimaldi, “A formal definition of Big Data based on its essential features”, Library Review, Vol. 65 Issue 
3 pp. 122 – 135 
82 OECD (2015), p. 71 
83 A more detailed discussion of how products and services are improved and economic efficiency is raised by 
the use of data can be found here: Atorité de la concurrence and Bundeskartellamt, pp. 9-10 
84 A striking example of a combination of these metaphors is made here: European Consumer Commissioner 
Meglena Kuneva, “personal data is the new oil of the internet and the new currency of the digital world”  (key-
note speech at Roundtable on Online Data Collection, Targeting and Profiling), Brussels, 31 March 2009, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-09-156_en.htm (accessed on 20 February 2017). For an in-depth 
discussion of metaphors regarding big data, see OECD (2015) p. 178. For more examples of this metaphor in use, 
see also Michael Haupt, “Data is the New Oil” — A Ludicrous Proposition, Medium, 2 May 2016, 
https://medium.com/twenty-one-hundred/data-is-the-new-oil-a-ludicrous-proposition-
1d91bba4f294#.fzm81nhar (accessed 24 March 2017) 
85 Sources discussing data as an infrastructure includes the OECD (2015) pp. 179-183. Another proponent of data 
as infrastructure is the British NGO, the Open Data Institute – see here: Open Data Institute, What is data 
infrastructure? [online] https://theodi.org/what-is-data-infrastructure (accessed 20 February 2017) 
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3.2. The big data value chain 
The nature of big data is not like that of a physical good, which can be stored in a warehouse and 
processed in a workshop, to be distributed and sold in physical stores – describing much of a linear 
journey from its collection from its natural state to it reaching the end customer as a refined product. 
Big data displays a much different behaviour altogether, owing to its intangible nature: it is non-rival 
and benefits from economics of scale.86 Big data is exchanged and stored by many different actors, 
where value is extracted in a complex ecosystem made of many markets that are intertwined with 
each other. The Commission has acknowledged this “eco-system” logic as a tool for understanding the 
business realities of companies in a competition analyse.87 
A suggested value chain of big data, which seems to hold some consensus among scholars in the field, 
is the following:  
1. data [is] collected directly from users and from machines in many different ways or 
can be bought from data brokers;  
2. data [is] stored on internal servers or on external cloud computing services; 
3. data [is] analysed with software analytics and the valuable information can be used 
to improve and personalise products’ characteristics and prices as well as their 
marketing, to improve process and organisation or for many other purposes such as 
controlling epidemics or managing emergencies.88  
As can be gleamed from this elaborated value chain, the interdependencies and relations between 
actors around the globe quickly forms a dense network that can be hard to decode without having a 
firm knowledge in the field of internet and telecom technology.  
 
Figure 1 – illustrative overview of the big data value chain (source: personal collection) 
Since the data is a non-rival resource, the use of it does not consume it, meaning that there is rather a 
circularity than a linearity in the ecosystems of data that make up the big data value chain, since the 
amount of data available to potentially make use of is ever increasing. 
                                                          
86 These terms will be outlined in the end of this chapter, and discussed in detail in Appendix 1.  
87 COMP/M.6314 – Telefónica UK/ Vodafone UK/ Everything Everywhere/ JV, para. 540 
88 As suggested, verbatim from the project report from Centre on regulation in Europe (CERRE): Marc Bourreau, 
Alexandre de Streel, Inge Graef, Big Data and competition policy – market power, personalised pricing and 
advertising, 16 February 2017. The report itself cites OECD (2015) ch. 2 and “V. Mayer-Schoenberger and K. 
Cukier (2013) Big data – a revolution that will change how we live, work and think, Eamon Dolan/Mariner books.”  
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3.2.1. Big data as input or output 
Inputs are necessary for the production of goods and services (outputs). Above, the value chain of data 
can be thought of as the necessary steps for obtaining data as an input, i.e. it needs to be both 
collected, stored and analysed to be made useful in the production of goods and services.  
Today, companies can use data as an input for different purposes, but two broad categories can be 
defined: cost-saving purposes, and revenue-generating purposes. The company’s skill and experience 
of using data determines its capabilities of using the data, where revenue-generation and disruptive 
innovation using data requires a higher degree of technological maturity within the company.89 The 
overall trend can be assumed to be that companies allocate resources to enhancing their digital 
maturity so as to not get obsolete and lose market shares. The companies that uses innovative business 
models based on the deployment of applications that use data generated through the web and/or 
other sensors, can be said to build their offerings on top of existing data, which means that the data is 
used as an input to provide their offering.90 
3.2.1.1. Content and quality of data 
Defining the value of data is somewhat similar to defining the value of wind: it can be used for many 
things, but to say that it has an absolute value becomes absurd. The value of data is mainly dependent 
on how well it fits with the aims and goals of the organisation that will use it in their business operation 
– like sailors cannot command the wind, but only adjust their sails. One could summarise this as the 
value of the data being dependent on the capabilities of the entity in control of it. Regardless of this 
open nature, some dimensions of the instrumental value of data can be discerned: time and volume. 
The time aspect of the value of data is not to be confused with one of the three V:s that describes the 
nature of big data, velocity.91 The economic value of data can have a temporal aspect to it, in that some 
types of personal data has a steady value over time, for instance the name and date of birth of a 
customer, whereas other types need to be relatively updated to be of any value – for instance the 
customer’s current address.92  
The volume aspect of data is more complex. Generally, one can assume that having more data is 
preferable to having less data. In practice, one could say that there are thresholds of data volume that 
must be overcome to enable some functions or actions. For web searches, in the Microsoft/Yahoo! 
search business merger decision, Microsoft argued that it becomes increasingly easy to run tests and 
improve the search algorithm the more data the organisation has access to.93 The Commission noted 
                                                          
89 OECD 2015 p. 88 
90 ibid 
91 Velocity originally denoted an organisation’s capacity to handle a high velocity of data input, i.e. many different 
data points collected with short intervals of time – see Doug Laney, 3D data management: controlling data 
volume, velocity and variety, META group research note, 6 Februari 2001, https://blogs.gartner.com/doug-
laney/files/2012/01/ad949-3D-Data-Management-Controlling-Data-Volume-Velocity-and-Variety.pdf (accessed 
12 March 2017), p. 2 
92 UK competition & markets authority, The commercial use of consumer data. Report on the CMA’s call for 
information [online], June 2015, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/435817/The_commercial_us
e_of_consumer_data.pdf (accessed 14 March 2017), pp. 75-76 
93 COMP/M.5727 - Microsoft/ Yahoo! search business, para. 162. For a more illustrative example of how smaller 
search engines are less intuitive than Google’s, see Rebecca Sentence, ‘Going over to the duck side: a week using 
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this, but stated that there is a diminishing return of benefit with increasing volumes of data.94 This is 
an important distinction to make here, whether the thresholds should be viewed as not barring any 
capabilities or activities but only denote the point after which more data confer no additional 
competitive advantage, or whether the thresholds should be regarded as toll gates after which new 
phenomena can emerge from the data. The Commission’s opinion in the mentioned merger points to 
the former alternative. This is an important question in regards of the economical nature of data, and 
depending on who you ask you will get different answers, as it can affect many parameters in a 
competition analysis.95 
3.3. The characteristics of data 
Data displays unique economic characteristics and dynamics. The main concepts will be outlined here 
to provide a basic understanding of the notions discussed in subsequent chapters. More information 
is available in Appendix 1.   
Data is a non-rival good, meaning that the use of data does not deplete it and that data can be used 
simultaneously by more than one individual. For instance, you and I both can read this thesis at the 
same time (assuming we have access to separate copies of it), and us doing so would not prevent 
readers after us from being able to read the thesis.  
Economies of scale is a term that describes how a process can become more efficient as it is performed 
at a larger scale. Where the effects of economies of scale are present, the big can be expected to 
become bigger if all other factors remain unchanged. In competition law, the benefits of economies of 
scale can offset consumer harm stemming from concentration in the relevant market.  
Similar to economies of scale, but not identical, are feedback effects. This can occur if an output of a 
system is routed in part or full into the input of the same system, thus creating self-enforcing effects. 
Feedback effects are very common in digital economies, owing to the circular nature of data eco-
systems. 
Network effects are also similar to economies of scale and feedback effects, but should not be 
confused with the two. Network effects arise when the value of a good becomes higher as more users 
adopt it – the most commonly used example to describe this is the telephone: it becomes more useful 
the more people and places you can phone.  
                                                          
DuckDuckGo’, Search Engine Watch, 1 March 2016, https://searchenginewatch.com/2016/03/01/going-over-to-
the-duck-side-a-week-with-duckduckgo/ [accessed 14 March 2017]. 
94 COMP/M.5727 - Microsoft/ Yahoo! search business, para. 171 
95 For more information, see Inge Graef, ‘Market definition and market power in data’, World competition, 38, 
no. 4, 2015, pp. 486-487 
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4. Defining the relevant product market for data  
Market shares are a useful indicator of market structure and the competitive importance of the actors 
on the market.96 The market is defined according with case law and a Commission notice,97 which 
provides that the relevant product market and the relevant geographical market should be assessed. 
The main factor for defining the relevant product market is the level of substitutability of the product 
with the competitors’ offerings. 
Dominance of an undertaking is associated with competition problems. This means that if the 
Commission finds that at least one party is dominant in the market, or that the merged entity will 
become dominant as a result of the concentration, the concentration will often be deemed to be not 
compatible with the market.98 On the other hand, if the market shares of the post-merger entity is less 
than 25-30 % and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is less than 2000, a merger can be presumed to not 
be incompatible with the market.99 
To establish if dominance is at hand, market shares is one important piece of information, but a 
mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods is also used. Quantitative methods mean that the 
undertakings annual turnover or volume of sales are compared to the total number of that of the 
market of competing products. Qualitative methods mean that the structure of the market in question 
is analysed, and how the possibly dominant undertaking have power in the market. As a rule of thumb, 
if an undertaking can do as it pleases without suffering negative consequences from competitors or 
consumers, it can be assumed to be in a dominant position.100 This logic is enshrined in the so-called 
SSNIP test (small but significant non-transitory increase in price), implying that if the dominant could 
increase the price without losing customers or making new competitors enter the market, it is probably 
dominant. 
                                                          
96 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03), para. 14; Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal 
mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 265/07), 
para. 24 
97 Commission notice on market definition [1997] OJ 372/05 
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Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03), para. 2. Also, in regards of conglomerate mergers, the 
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Competition Law”, MIT Press, December 2005, available here: 
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While the absolute level of the HHI can give an initial indication of the competitive pressure in the market post-
merger, the change in the HHI (known as the "delta") is a useful proxy for the change in concentration directly 
brought about by the merger.” 
100 Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, paragraph 38 
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The European Commission has not yet defined the relevant product market for data,101 despite it 
having handled several merger cases where the companies in question have been highly dependent 
on data for their business models. The market definition in those cases has been centred on the 
function of the service (output), rather than input factors that enable the service.  
The main reason for this is that the basic principles of defining markets, as laid out in the Commissions 
notice on market definition, presupposes the existence of a supply and demand for the product or 
service in question, as the substitutability of the product or service on both the supplier side and 
demand side is fundamental for the competitive analysis.102 Since it is common that big companies 
state that they do not sell the data which they collect from users to third parties,103 a market for data 
cannot be defined in the traditional sense. Nevertheless, the companies’ privacy policies often inform 
or reserve the rights that data can be shared with partners or “trusted parties”, which leaves the 
companies the possibility to communicate the data – but without a direct monetary remuneration for 
it. Large companies (such as the “GAFA” companies Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, for instance) 
that do sell or license data in transactions are few. Twitter is the only big social network that sells data 
from its service. The small number of companies selling their data constitutes the exception from the 
main rule, that data is not commonly traded as a commodity in the world of large digital platforms. 
In its merger decision concerning Facebook and WhatsApp, the Commission made clear that the “non-
selling” practice of the companies made it superfluous to pursue a market definition with respect to 
the provision of data or data analytics services, as long as the data dependent operations are 
performed within the confines of the business operation.104 Instead, the Commission opted to 
investigate the market definition in regards of advertising, as opposed to data or data analytics 
services. Similarly, in one of the earliest “data merger” decisions (Google/Doubleclick), the Commission 
defined the product market as (inter alia) “online advertising” without exploring the data dependent 
aspects of the companies’ business models.105  
In my opinion, for products and services that fall in the category of “enhanced” products,106 there are 
good reasons for using a product definition that focuses on the functionality or value proposition 
offered by the product or service, rather than focusing on the supply chain that enables the offering in 
the first place, as the latter would be impractical and yield no useful results. However, this approach 
will become problematic when the offering in question is not an existing product that is enhanced by 
data, but a totally new product that is enabled or composed by data – then the eco-system described 
above must be considered in the competitive analysis. 
                                                          
101 From Competition Commissioner Joaquín Almunia in a speech at Privacy Platform event: Competition and 
Privacy in Markets of Data (Brussels), 26 November 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-
860_en.htm (accessed 7 March 2017). Also: Graef, Market definition and market power in data, p. 489 
102 Commission notice on market definition [1997] OJ 372/05, paras. 13-23 
103 As is stated in the privacy policies of Google, Facebook, Spotify, and several other companies (accessed 7 
March 2017). Flows of data from Facebook have included: third-party applications collecting data from friends 
of the user, even if the friend had restricted sharing of their data, and Facebook sharing users’ personal 
information* with advertisers in conflict with promising not to: Pasquale, pp. 144-145 
* “Personal information” is the American legal term that corresponds to “personal data”, but their meaning is 
not identical. 
104 COMP/M.7217 - Facebook/ Whatsapp, paras. 70-72. 
105 COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick, para. 73 (44-73) 
106 i.e. products that have existed for a long time but have been “enhanced” by the use of data, as discussed in 
2.1 (Is possession of or control over data relevant for the functioning of the market?) 
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Outside of the world of large digital 
platforms, a study of the distribution of 
data sharing models, done by Deloitte on 
the behalf of the Commission, a first 
classification of the main aspects of data 
sharing has been established. It states that 
in 78 % of the cases, data is generated and 
analysed in-house. The data is not traded 
with third parties, but used for vertical 
integration or for e.g. enhancing the 
efficiency of internal processes or for 
improving client service. Of the remaining 
22 %, 2 % are accounted for by open data 
sharing practices (e.g. “data 
philanthropy”), and 20 % by more or less 
well-developed markets (e.g. financial 
data).107 However, the number of 
organisations and companies seeking to sell their data or purchase new data sets from others to 
provide new business models and additional revenue streams is expected to increase exponentially.108 
Also, companies are opening up some of the data that they hold through Application Programming 
Interfaces (“APIs”) for access by third party applications. This practice can be said to follow the open 
innovation logic of spinning out assets that per se are valuable, but not necessarily for the organisation 
that owns it due to strategic misalignment or lack of resources.109  
4.1. Input markets for data  
An input market is where buyers and sellers of the input can conduct business, so that the buyers can 
satisfy their need of the input as a factor of production, and the seller can provide productive services 
(labouring or selling capital) in return for a remuneration. An example of this would be the early 
morning food market that a chef visits to pick out the produce that will be used in the menu of the 
day.  
The discussion about defining a separate input market for data traces back to 2007, when the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) approved the merger of Google and DoubleClick. In its 4-1 decision, a 
dissenting statement was issued by Pamela Jones Harbour arguing that the competitive analysis would 
be incomplete without assessing the impact on the input market for data, as the analysis that the FTC 
performed was too narrow and static in its scope where it should have been more dynamic and 
forward-looking.110  
                                                          
107 Commission Staff Working Document pp. 14-15 
108 Commission Staff Working Document p. 13 
109 ibid 
110 In regards of future merger decisions: “it might have been possible to define a putative relevant product 
market comprising data that may be useful to advertisers and publishers who wish to engage in behavioral 
targeting.” - Dissenting Statement Of Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour In the matter of Google/DoubleClick 
F.T.C. File No. 071-0170 
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This dissenting statement was later expanded upon and published as an article, co-authored with 
Harbour’s attorney advisor, Tara Isa Koslov. In the article, the role of network effects in 2SP:s as a factor 
for maintaining a competitive advantage was discussed more in detail, with the use of Google as a 
thematic backdrop for the discussion (with a due reservation that Google was not asserted as being a 
dominant company, but merely used as an example of a highly innovative and successful company 
with a large market share).111 By using a data market component in the competitive analysis, that is 
separate from the data services market, it would highlight the distinction between data collection at 
one point in time and the use of it at a later point in time when possible new opportunities for 
monetisation of the data might have appeared that were not previously there – something which 
Harbour and Koslov argues better reflects the business reality of the firms.112 This scenario later 
became reality, as illustrated in the Facebook/WhatsApp merger and its aftermath.  
In the European setting, the opportunistic gathering of personal data is somewhat restricted in the 
current Data Protection Directive 95/46 (art. 6.1) as it limits data collection to data that is adequate, 
relevant and not excessive in relation to the specifically specified purposes for which they are collected 
and/or further processed. This principle is upheld in the coming GDPR Directive 2016/679 art. 5.1.d 
(the “data minimisation” principle) and it is further integrated in other data protection aspects such as 
“data protection by design and default” (art. 25), which will make serendipitous use of data less viable 
than before.  
Harbour and Koslov’s argument was made in 2010 and in an American context, meaning that it was 
made several years prior to today’s technological landscape and in a legal context that does not have 
as strict data protection rules as the European Union. Consequently, the main arguments for the use 
of a separate data-as-input market suggested by Harbour and Koslov are not as valid in the 
contemporary European discussion – but nevertheless, the main idea behind the argument, that an 
input market for data allows for a better and more accurate competitive analysis, still holds true.113  
A market definition is an important tool for assessing the competitive constraints that companies 
face.114 Considering the lack of alternative tools for assessing this, and the importance of data as a 
competitive asset, it stands to argue that a market definition for data is necessary so that the 
competitive constraints of companies can be properly identified.  
Below, the possibilities of creating a hypothetical input market for data will be explored, something 
which could serve as a substitute to a classical market definition and function as the tool that is needed 
for assessing the competitive constraints in terms of data which companies face.  
4.1.1. The legal setting for input markets as factors in competitive analysis  
Is there a possibility for hypothetical markets in European competition law? 
European competition law is open to consider that the relevant market in question may be that of the 
raw material used to manufacture the end-product.115 Non-trade of the goods on that market does 
                                                          
111 Pamela Jones Harbour, Tara Isa Koslov, Section 2 in a web 2.0 – an expanded vision of relevant product 
markets, Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 76, pp. 783-787 
112 ibid, p. 773  
113 Graef, Market definition and market power in data, pp. 493 and 504-505 
114 Commission notice on market definition [1997] OJ 372/05, para. 2 
115 Joined cases 6 and 7-73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. and Commercial Solvents Corporation v 
Commission of the European Communities, para. 22 
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not prevent the market from existing.116 It is even sufficient that the market is potential or 
hypothetical.117 In Microsoft, it was confirmed that the relevant product market could be composed of 
an asset of a company which it refused to deal.118 
Whilst all three statements above are supported by European case law, they all pertain to abuse of 
dominance and non-delivery (it is also worth noting that in the three latter cases, the non-delivery is 
in the form of refusal to grant an intellectual property license). The point I want to make with this 
caveat is that the hypothetical market has so far only been used in ex post cases concerning abuse of 
dominance, where the competitive harm can be shown, thus justifying the artificial nature of the 
market definition. Whether ex ante decisions warrant a higher degree of tangibility of the market is a 
question that we will only know the answer to if/when the Commission makes a decision concerning 
this, but in my view it is plausible that ex ante decisions imposes a stricter requirement of tangible 
proof that the market is not entirely hypothetical, as the grounds for the decision would otherwise be 
founded on too much speculation.   
Since data is mainly not traded as a commodity today, traditional supply and demand cannot be said 
to exist. Hence, the relevant market for data as an input can only be hypothetical. An analysis involving 
the hypothetical market would in turn have to be built on assumptions on how such a market would 
be structured, and traditional competition law concepts such as the substitutability of the product 
could then be used within this hypothetical frame.119  
In the Commission’s notice on the definition of relevant markets, companies are said to face three 
primary competitive restraints: demand substitutability, supply substitutability, and potential 
competition (where the latter is not taken into account when defining markets, but once the position 
of the companies involved in the relevant market has been ascertained and their position gives raise 
for concerns from a competition point of view).120  
While no competition case has led to an analysis of the market definition for data itself,121 several of 
the Commission’s merger decisions have touched upon how data plays a role in determining the 
competitive landscape prior to and after a merger. By analysing these cases and the already established 
terminology that the Commission is using in regards of data, the necessary elements and preconditions 
for a hypothetical market for data as input can be learned. 
4.1.1.1. Google/Doubleclick (2008) 
The Commission defined the relevant product markets as “online advertising space”, “intermediation 
in online advertising”, and “provision of online ad serving technology”.122 
The Commission found that in regards of data collected by other online operators, the type of data 
collected by DoubleClick is relatively narrow in scope and not of unique and non-replicable qualities. 
Other companies active in online advertising have the ability to collect large amounts of more or less 
                                                          
116 Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications 
Ltd (ITP) v Commission of the European Communities, paras. 7-10 and 24 
117 Case C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG., para. 44 
118 Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v Commission of the European Communities, paras. 335-336, and 708 
119 This idea was, to the extent of my knowledge, originally proposed here: Graef, Market definition and market 
power in data, p. 495 
120 Commission notice on market definition [1997] OJ 372/05, paras. 13 and 24 
121 Almunia; Graef, Market definition and market power in data, p. 489 
122 COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick, paras. 44-56, 57-73, and 74-81, respectively 
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similar information that is potentially useful for advertisement targeting, such as major web publishers 
by collecting registration and browsing data from the users of their sites. Also, internet service 
providers (“ISPs”) can track all online behaviour of their customers, following them to every website 
they visit, which constitutes data that is much broader and richer than the data collected by 
DoubleClick. The commission concludes that the competition based on the quality of collected data is 
not only decided by the size of the data sets, but what different types of data the competitors have 
access to and which type will eventually prove to be the most useful for internet advertising 
purposes.123  
From this I gather that a product market for data as an input would be very narrowly defined (which is 
in line with the Commission’s general practice),124 as the Commission acknowledges that different 
types of data are of varying utility for internet advertising purposes. Similarly, different types of data 
must then be of varying utility also for other purposes than advertising.   
4.1.1.2. TomTom/Tele Atlas (2008) 
One of the product markets identified in this decision was that of navigable digital map databases.125 
Such a database can be described as a product of highly refined sets of big data, as they contain many 
elements, such as geographical data that has been aggregated with data about traffic rules, points of 
interest, and other relevant information for the map.126  
The degree of demand side substitutability between digital map databases for navigation purposes 
and non-navigation purposes are held as limited, and the degree of substitutability on the supply side 
is held as one-sided, meaning that producers of high quality maps can easily make low quality maps 
but not vice versa.127 
The providers of navigation software describes navigable digital map databases as a key input for 
navigation software. Subsequently, this makes navigable digital map databases also an input for device 
makers (who often partner with navigation software providers to create products).128 Concerns were 
also voiced by downstream actors about the merged entity raising prices of for navigable digital map 
databases, providing databases of lower quality or delaying the availability of new features and 
updates.129 
What makes this case special is that the data in it is a highly refined product, which consequently is 
also treated as a product much like any else (with the exception for its non-rivalrous qualities). This 
might give an important clue as to how to decide between using the data-enabled product’s use as the 
determinant factor when defining the product market, or to use its data quality: the more refined and 
specific the data is, the more sense it makes to use the utility it serves as the determinant for the 
product market definition. 
                                                          
123 COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick, paras. 269-273 
124 Ulf Bernitz, Svensk och europeisk marknadsrätt. 1, Konkurrensrätten och marknadsekonomins rättsliga 
grundvalar, Norstedts juridik, Stockholm, 2015, p. 142 
125 COMP/M.4853 – TomTom/ Tele Atlas, para. 38 
126 COMP/M.4853 – TomTom/ Tele Atlas, para. 18 
127 COMP/M.4853 – TomTom/ Tele Atlas, paras. 22-23 
128 COMP/M.4853 – TomTom/ Tele Atlas, paras. 164-165 
129 COMP/M.4853 – TomTom/ Tele Atlas, para. 190 – an example of “versioning” and “delaying” data to 
counteract pricing problems, discussed in: Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian, Information Rules, Harvard Business 
School press, Boston, Massachusetts, 1999, pp. 39 and 56 
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While this makes sense on the one hand, it would prove a problematic method in the long run as 
products can be expected to become increasingly complex, drawing upon an increasing number of 
suppliers for their parts. If data is treated like a mechanical part like any other in for instance a physical 
product, it becomes crucial to assess the level of refinement of the data so as to make the best possible 
product definition of it. It becomes paradoxical that the more refined the data is, the more likely it is 
to become treated like an input, whereas in practice it is rather the contrary: low-grade data is most 
often used as an input and high quality data is used or offered as an end product.    
4.1.1.3. Telefónica UK/ Vodafone UK/ Everything Everywhere/ JV (2012) 
In this decision, the Commission assesses whether there are two separate product markets for 
providing data analytics for mobile contra static advertising, and the respondents – both suppliers and 
buyers of the product – think that there is no substitutability between the two, but the Commission 
leaves the question open as it has no significant impact on the analysis.130 
One of the companies in the merger, JV Co, is of particular interest as it operates in a broad range of 
data analytics services. The Commission assessed whether the combining of personal information, 
location data, response data, social behaviour data and browsing data into a single database would 
become an essential input for providers of mobile data analytics services that would be hard to 
replicate.131 However, the information available to JV Co is also to a large extent available to both 
existing and new market players, which consequently led the Commission to judge the geo-location 
aspect of the information to be of most interest as it was the hardest, although not impossible, for 
other actors to obtain or collect.132 
From this, I deduce that the Commission holds that the data types of personal information, location 
data, response data, social behaviour data and browsing data is to be considered as substitutable on 
an input market for data (in the sense that other companies could theoretically collect the various 
types, not that the types are interchangeable with each other), meaning that a competitor is 
considered able to make do with data of the same type but collected from a different group of 
individuals.  
4.1.1.4. Facebook/WhatsApp (2014) 
The Commission’s starting point refers back its decisions in Google/DoubleClick and 
Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business, and concludes that online advertising constitutes a relevant market 
separate from offline advertising.133 In the decision, the Commission analyses (among other things) the 
potential data concentration in regards of how likely it is to strengthen Facebook’s position in the 
online advertising market and its sub-segments (concerns related to privacy are to be dealt with EU 
data protection rules, not competition law rules).134 One of the two main theories of harm examined 
in regards of strengthening Facebook’s position in the online advertising market is that WhatsApp 
could be used as a potential source of user data for the purpose of improving the targeting of 
Facebook’s advertising activities outside of WhatsApp.135  
                                                          
130 Case No COMP/M.6314 – Telefónica UK/ Vodafone UK/ Everything Everywhere/ JV paras. 199-203 
131 COMP/M.6314 – Telefónica UK/ Vodafone UK/ Everything Everywhere/ JV paras. 539-541 
132 COMP/M.6314 – Telefónica UK/ Vodafone UK/ Everything Everywhere/ JV paras. 543-545 
133 COMP/M.7217 – Facebook / WhatsApp, para. 79 
134 COMP/M.7217 – Facebook / WhatsApp, para. 164 
135 COMP/M.7217 – Facebook / WhatsApp, paras. 167 and 180 
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As mentioned previously, in order for Facebook to enact the theory of harm it would have to change 
WhatsApp’s privacy policy and perform a technical integration of the profiles on WhatsApp and 
Facebook. The feasibility of whether the latter was achievable or not was contested amongst 
respondents and the Notifying Party.136  
When it comes to the Commission’s analysis of the substitutability of the advertising platform itself, 
the market investigation indicated that Facebook is an important advertising avenue (due to its large 
and highly engaged user base), but that there are also a sufficient number of alternative providers of 
advertising services that compete with Facebook (such as Google and its various offerings, Yahoo!, 
MSN and local providers.137 Furthermore, the 
Commission also noted that there are a 
significant number of market participants that 
also collect user data alongside Facebook, and 
provided a graph to overview an estimate share 
of data collection across the web (see the figure 
to the right).138 
I am not contesting the numbers presented in 
the graph, and it should be noted that it is 
presented by the Commission purely for 
illustrative purposes, but I still find it possible to 
argue that there is a problematic element in the 
Commission’s broad strokes in regards of data. 
As I have discussed in relation to the cases 
above, different types of data are of varying 
utility for internet advertising purposes, and similarly, different types of data must then be of varying 
utility also for other purposes than advertising – a sentiment discussed by the Commission in the 
Google/DoubleClick merger decision.139 In the decision at hand, the Commission mentions a number 
of companies (Google, Apple, Amazon, eBay, Microsoft, AOL, Yahoo!, Twitter, IAC, LinkedIn, Adobe 
and Yelp, among others), that collects data on the web,140 but what is necessary to do – albeit laborious 
– is to analyse what types of data the companies are best posed to collect, and what niches of customer 
segments will be interested in that data.141 
                                                          
136 COMP/M.7217 – Facebook / WhatsApp, para. 185 
137 COMP/M.7217 – Facebook / WhatsApp, para. 177 (I personally find it curious that Yahoo! and MSN are 
mentioned as feasible alternatives in Europe, 2014)  
138 COMP/M.7217 – Facebook / WhatsApp, para. 188. The following footnote accompanies the graph (107), here 
cited in its entirety: “The data in this graph originate from an external market intelligence company and have 
been produced for purposes unrelated to the assessment of the Transaction. Those data are presented here for 
purely illustrative purposes and are without prejudice to any possible market definition as regards the provision 
of data, which, as explained above paragraph (72) is not covered by the Commission's assessment in the present 
decision.” 
139 COMP/M.4731 – Google / DoubleClick, paras. 269-273 
140 COMP/M.7217 – Facebook / WhatsApp, para. 188 
141 The professional network LinkedIn, for instance, would currently not be a good place to find the next pop idol, 
but perhaps rather a talented young individual. Similarly, I assume that AOL and Yahoo! mostly caters to an 
audience of users that used the net prior to the advent of Google, and hence displays certain demographic 
characteristics such as middle age and above and a large share of male users. These are my own assumptions.  
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The Commission concludes that regardless of what the merged entity will do with the WhatsApp user 
data to improve targeted advertising on Facebook’s social network, there will continue to be a large 
amount of internet user data that are valuable for advertising purposes that is not within Facebook’s 
exclusive control.142 In addition to the concerns I raise about the colour-blindness in regards of what 
data is valuable, the notion of exclusive control also warrants comment: exclusive control of data that 
is present on the web is hard to have, both before and after it has been collected, and the dimension 
of non-rivalry needs to be more nuanced in a competitive analysis.  
If the reasoning used by the Commission in this decision would be used to define a relevant market for 
data, that market would in effect become the one-and-only market for all data there is, not taking into 
consideration the notions different types of data which are not substitutable with each other that has 
been used in previous decisions. The reason for this divergence in reasoning is not clear to me.  
4.1.1.5. Microsoft/LinkedIn (2016) 
In this merger decision, data does not play a pivotal role in the analysis, but is nevertheless analysed 
in regards of sales intelligence solutions (a form of customer retention system (“CRM”) that provides 
sales professionals with background and contact information about individuals (such as name, address, 
phone number, place of employment, title and position, etc.) or companies (such as financial 
information and metrics, organisational hierarchy and leadership structure, company’s products and 
services, industry background, etc.).143 Also, data becomes relevant in regards to search/non-search 
advertising, which is also a component of the analysis.144 
In the horizontal perspective, the post-merger combination of data from LinkedIn is restricted by 
national data protection rules and relatively soon also even more restricted due the GDPR.145 However, 
this finding can be construed as somewhat naïve and forgetful of past experiences, as Facebook 
proceeded to do just that (change the privacy policy of WhatsApp) subsequent to the acquisition (the 
data sharing with its new parent company led WhatsApp to being fined by the Italian competition 
authorities).146 
The Commission entertains a hypothetical argument in which the combination of data is allowed, and 
discusses two ways in which a merger may raise horizontal issues because of the combination of data, 
one of which is of particular interest for the investigation in this chapter:   
“the combination of two datasets post-merger may increase the merged entity's market 
power in a hypothetical market for the supply of this data or increase barriers to 
entry/expansion in the market for actual or potential competitors, which may need this 
data to operate on this market. Competitors may indeed be required to collect a larger 
                                                          
142 COMP/M.7217 – Facebook / WhatsApp, para. 188 
143 COMP/M.8124 – Microsoft / LinkedIn, para. 57 
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145 COMP/M.8124 – Microsoft / LinkedIn, paras. 176-178 
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dataset in order to compete effectively with the merged entity than absent the merger.”147 
(My underline) 
Compared with the reasoning in the Facebook/WhatsApp decision, the Commission can be said to 
make a more careful analysis here which successfully captures a complex and dynamic reality. 
Unfortunately, as this data aspect is not crucial for the Commission’s analysis nor particularly realistic 
due to privacy rules, the statement is left without elaboration upon – but nevertheless, it shows that 
the Commission is open to consider a hypothetical market for the supply of data. The market is in this 
case indeed hypothetical, as neither party in the merger makes their respective data available to third 
parties for advertising purposes (save for limited exceptions),148 thus making the traditional supply- 
and demand logic inapplicable.149  
In regards of machine learning in CRM software solutions, the Commission notes that there are many 
other possible sources of data available,150 and that even if LinkedIn data were to be used for such 
applications, it would only constitute one of many types of data needed for that purpose.151 
As such, this case is very interesting as it confirms that the Commission has knowledge and 
understanding of the particularities of a data economy, both in terms of what data is used and 
required, but also how it can serve as an input for companies in its “raw” form (as opposed to its 
“refined” form, discussed in TomTom/Tele Atlas).  
4.1.2. Summary of case evidence and support for a data-as-input market 
The Commission’s merger decisions focus mostly on the end-product made with the data, analysing 
this more carefully than the implications that the merger has on the data ecosystem in which it resides. 
While not necessarily being a conventional part of the analysis, assessing ecosystem implications might 
become increasingly crucial in the digital economy as innovation is one of the strongest means of 
competition in it.152  
                                                          
147 COMP/M.8124 – Microsoft / LinkedIn, para. 179 – the sentiment that the data could constitute an important 
input in the near-future was also voiced by actors participating in the market investigation, but then in a vertical 
capacity (para. 246) 
148 COMP/M.8124 – Microsoft / LinkedIn, para. 180. A similar hypothetical licensing argument is made in para. 
251 
149 A curious aspect here is that the Commission does not take into consideration is that while LinkedIn have not 
licensed out data, it has been scraped of it by unknown third parties that have registered fake profiles on the 
website. The scraping was performed by creating bots that made connections with regular users and scanned 
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Nicole Greenberg, ‘The LinkedIn lawsuit: you can run, but you can’t hide’, Recruiting Daily, 10 January 2014, 
http://recruitingdaily.com/linkedin-lawsuit-truth-nothing-truth/ [accessed 10 March 2017]. The lawsuit itself can 
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150 COMP/M.8124 – Microsoft / LinkedIn, para. 262 
151 COMP/M.8124 – Microsoft / LinkedIn, para. 259 
152 “[T]he Commission notes that the consumer communications sector is a recent and fast-growing sector which 
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to be ephemeral.”: COMP/M.7217 – Facebook / WhatsApp, para. 99. However, the idea that competition 
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eventual displacement”: Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society – The secret algorithms that control money and 
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Also, as shown in the Google/DoubleClick decision, the Commission is inclined to make narrow 
definitions of the product in question to create narrow market definitions. In light of how particular 
data is in regards of type and content, and how dependent its value is on the capabilities of the entity 
controlling it, there is a paradoxical element in the Commission’s approach: the more narrow and 
specific the commission tries to define the data, the more elusive and enigmatic it will become as the 
data appears increasingly worthless the closer one looks at it.  
In the table below, I have summarised how the Commission has treated data in the merger decisions 
discussed above. As can be seen, there are several indications that taking a more nuanced approach 
to data in a merger or competition analysis would neither conflict with nor be disconnected from the 
Commission’s earlier methodology.  
Table: summary of merger decisions 
Data can be 
viewed as a 
product 
Not all data is 
the same: 
different types 
of data can be 
discerned 
Data can serve 
as an input for 
other 
endeavours 




data as input 
Telefónica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything 
Everywhere/JV 
 X X  
Google/Doubleclick  X   
TomTom/Tele Atlas X X X  
Facebook/WhatsApp   X  
Microsoft/LinkedIn  X X X 
 
Furthermore, in the Microsoft/LinkedIn merger decision, the Commission explicitly mentions a 
hypothetical input market for data as a tool for assessing a measure’s compatibility with the internal 
market, which is a strong indication that such a method might in fact be used in future decisions.  
In the section below, I will try to explore how such a hypothetical market could be constructed and 
understood, so that it could be a useful tool in a competitive analysis which would be helped by having 
a relevant market for data as a component of the analysis.  
4.2. Constructing a hypothetical market for data as an input 
When defining the relevant market, existing case law is used when so can be done, and otherwise the 
Commission’s notice on market definition provides guidelines as to how the market is defined. The 
main purpose of defining the relevant market is to systematically ascertain what competitive restraints 
the concerned companies are subjected to, and the purpose of defining both a product market and a 
geographical market is to identify the actual competitors of the undertaking in question that have the 
ability to constrain their behaviour and hinder them from acting independent of an effective 
competitive pressure.153 
                                                          
information, Harvard University Press, First Harvard University Press paperback edition, second printing, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2016, p. 81  
153 Commission notice on market definition [1997] OJ 372/05, para. 2 
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A relevant product market is defined as comprising “all those products and/or services which are 
regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products' 
characteristics, their prices and their intended use.”154 
A relevant geographical market is defined as comprising “the area in which the undertakings concerned 
are involved in the supply and demand of products or services, in which the conditions of competition 
are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from neighbouring areas because the 
conditions of competition are appreciably different in those area.”155 Due to constraints in the format 
of this thesis and the supranational nature of the internet (as it is today), the question of the relevant 
geographical market for data within the EU will not be pursued any further. I will conduct the following 
analysis under the assumption that the relevant geographical market for data is the entire EU, as there 
are no infrastructure barriers and otherwise negligible barriers to transport and trade, such as 
language and localised data protection rules.  
The basic principle of defining the relevant market is based on the idea that companies face three types 
of competitive restraints: 1) demand substitutability; 2) supply substitutability; and 3) potential 
competition. Demand substitutability is considered the strongest factor as an undertaking cannot be 
said to have significant impact on the prevailing conditions of sale if its customers are in a position to 
easily switch between available substitute products. The effects on the supply side substitutability is 
less immediate, and thus considered at a later stage of the competition analysis.156 
Picking up on the definition of the relevant product market, data will now be analysed in regards of its 
price and intended use, while its characteristics will only be briefly touched upon in this chapter, to be 
explored more in depth in regards of how it can lend market power to the undertaking controlling it. 
After this, the demand and supply side substitutability will be discussed.  
4.2.1. Determinants of price of data – what is the price that companies pay to get 
data? 
The assessment of demand substitution entails a determination of the range of products which are 
viewed as substitutes by the consumer (in this case, the companies using the data as an input). One 
way of doing this is by using quantitative tests or speculative experiments, postulating a small but 
lasting change in the prices of the product and evaluating the expected reactions of the customers.157  
As already discussed, most often data comes without a fixed price. Consequently, the question of the 
price of data boils down to one of transactions: can only transactions where goods are exchanged in 
trade for money be used in competition law? Is it possible to use other transactions? In the business 
reality of today, there are several indications that there is a market for data despite the lack of a 
traditional market and price tag for it. Below, a few principal methods for reaching a hypothetical price 
tag of data are discussed.  
                                                          
154 Commission notice on market definition [1997] OJ 372/05, para. 7 
155 Commission notice on market definition [1997] OJ 372/05, para. 8 
156 Commission notice on market definition [1997] OJ 372/05, paras. 13-14 
157 Commission notice on market definition [1997] OJ 372/05, para. 15 
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4.2.1.1. Users’ consent as payment 
”If you are not paying for it, you're not the customer; you're the product being sold.”158 
As the quote indicates, it is possible to regard “free” as not actually being free. Google and Facebook 
are prominent examples of companies marketing some of their services as “free” whilst the use of the 
services makes possible the collection of personal information about the users, either directly collected 
from them with consent, or indirectly by observing and inferring data from their behaviour.159  
Empirical research has revealed that personal data have an economic value to individuals and that such 
data can be 'monetised' by businesses providing digital content and digital services.160 The discussion 
is not so much centred around the question of whether or not user data can be seen as a remuneration 
for a service, but rather how to gauge this in an objective way.  
A clear indication of the significance of personal data in transactions can be found in The proposal for 
a directive on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content. In the proposal it 
is suggested that within the scope of the directive should be contracts where the supplier supplies 
digital content in exchange for an economic price, or other (active) counter-performance by the 
consumer in the form of personal data or any other data.161 The correlation between user data and 
service is further consolidated in regards of termination of the contract: if the consumer opts to 
terminate the contract due to non-conformity of the delivered digital content, the supplier shall “take 
all measures which could be expected in order to refrain from the use of the counter-performance other 
than money which the consumer has provided in exchange for the digital content and any other data 
collected by the supplier in relation to the supply of the digital content including any content provided 
by the consumer”.162 While this is (yet another) strong indication that user data can be regarded as a 
commodity,163 notions of a “propertisation” of user data164 must in the current situation – according 
                                                          
158 Posted by posted by blue_beetle at 1:41 PM on August 26, 2010, MetaFilter [online] 
http://www.metafilter.com/95152/Userdriven-discontent#32560467 (accessed 11 July 2017)  
159 Atorité de la concurrence and Bundeskartellamt, pp. 1-7  
160 European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), author: Rafał Mańko, Contracts for supply of digital content 
A legal analysis of the Commission's proposal for a new directive, May 2016. The Commission quotes a study 
saying that 81% of EU consumers think that their data have a value: Impact Assessment Accompanying the 
document Proposals for Directives of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) on certain aspects 
concerning contracts for the supply of digital content, Brussels, Brussels, 17 December 2015, SWD(2015) 274 
final/2, supply of digital content 1(b) (page 123 of the .pdf-version)  
161 Proposal for a Directive of The European Parliament and of The Council on certain aspects concerning 
contracts for the supply of digital content, Brussels, 9 December 2015, COM/2015/0634 final - 2015/0287 COD, 
art. 3.1. Excluded from the scope is when the counter-performance is only given to the extent of what is strictly 
necessary for the performance of the contract (art. 3.4). As a caveat, this discussion is focused on consumer 
protection and not competition – however, the discussion has some relevance for questions about competition 
as well: “Covering only digital content paid for with money would discriminate between different business models 
– it would provide an unjustified incentive for businesses to move towards offering digital content against data.”: 
page 123 of the .pdf-version of the Impact Assessment. 
162 Proposal for a Directive on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content, art. 13.2.b. 
163 As already mentioned above in COMP/M.6314 – Telefónica UK/ Vodafone UK/ Everything Everywhere/ JV, 
para. 543 
164 Such as this dissertation on the propertisation of personal data: Nadezhda N. Purtova, Property rights in 
personal data: A European perspective, PhD diss., Tilburg University, 2011 [online] 
https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/1312691/Purtova_property16-02-2011.pdf (accessed 12 March 2017). 
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to me - be held as somewhat futuristic and fanciful due to both the practical and legal complications 
surrounding the matter.165 
Fitting the would-be transaction between the user and provider of a service into a familiar legal or 
economic concept is hard, as the scope of the transaction from the side of the user is very unclear. 
Despite the user being familiar with the concept that they give access to their personal information 
when they use the services, they have little or no control over the amount and type of information 
that they use to gain access to the service, as the web services are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis 
(where A: the typical user cannot be expected to critically read the entire end users’ agreement and 
privacy policy, and B: even if the user would do so, they are also pressured by network effects and 
consequences of missing out of not joining for instance the social network).166 As such, for the actual 
user of a service the concept of data disclosure vis á vis privacy becomes more of a gut feeling rather 
than an economical decision, and has therefore thus far in the legal setting been treated as more of a 
question of quality, rather than quantity.167 
Correlating a price on personal data or the consent for it to be collected with its perceived value on 
the other side of the transaction becomes problematic from an economical perspective, as the 
instrumental value of data depends on the context, and factors such as the size and scope of the data. 
To summarise, the question still stands as to the value of personal data. Until we see parallel payment 
solutions offered where the user can decide to pay with either money or personal data, we will 
probably never learn the exact value of personal data by using this approach. As put by Competition 
Commissioner Margrethe Vestager: “the exchange rate between data and services isn't reported on 
the news.”168 
4.2.1.2. Damages 
In regards of quantitative measurements of the value of data, court decisions awarding the parties 
damages for infringements upon their IPRs protecting databases, or for theft of corporate secrets, 
could be an indication of the value of personal data. This is on the other hand problematic as data does 
not commonly fall under protection due to it being a database or business secret. Unfortunately for 
this investigation, no such court decision that concerns unwanted dispersion of personal data has come 
to my knowledge. Black market prices for collections of stolen data (such as account names and 
corresponding passwords) is most likely not a relevant indication of a price on the white market.  
                                                          
165 The propertisation of rights so as to make them usable as capital has been argued as an important aspect of 
western capitalism (Hernando de Soto, The mystery of capital : why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails 
everywhere else, Bantam, London, 2000), and there are signs within the field of copyright that the technology of 
distributed ledgers can be used to “watermark” copyrighted images so as to keep track of their use online (see 
for instance the service offered by the company “Binded” https://binded.com/ (accessed 13 July 2017)). 
Therefore I would say that it is possible to envision the same principle extended to personal data, and also not 
entirely improbable, as companies will have to accommodate for interoperability and transferability of personal 
data so as to avoid consumer lock-in effects, due to the GDPR. However, these considerations are purely 
speculative.  
166 This concept is originally discussed by Graef, Market definition and market power in data, p. 490 
167 The Commission acknowledges this in para. 87 of COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/ WhatsApp. For more 
information on data protection as a quality factor, see: Victoria Volny, Personuppgifter som valuta i den digitala 
ekonomin, degree project for a Degree in Master of Laws, Department of Law, Lund University, 2016 
168 Margrethe Vestager, Competition in a big data world, speech at DLD 16, Munich, 17 January 2016, available 
here https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/competition-big-
data-world_en (accessed 4 July 2017) 
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4.2.1.3. Mergers and acquisitions 
The deal value can give valuable information on how the data held by a company is valued by a 
company on the market, when for instance the annual turnover of the target company is very low (as 
was the case in the Facebook/WhatsApp acquisition). As mentioned before, this method will be 
implemented in national German merger reviews.169 
The root of the problem when it comes to fixing a monetary value on data is that it depends on whose 
hands the data is in, and what other sets of data that it can readily be used in combination with. 
Therefore, the price that Facebook is willing to pay for WhatsApp is much higher than that of what for 
instance a Swedish mining equipment manufacturer would be willing to pay, as Facebook can identify 
and profit from more synergies and possible uses for the WhatsApp technology and user base, than 
what the mining company can be reasonably be expected to.  
In merger decisions, this question becomes seemingly simple as the price tag for the deal is disclosed 
during the Commission review, but some problems are easy to predict: if the acquired company has 
several assets, a specific asset pricing list is necessary to learn the value of the data, and if no such list 
the possibilities of valuing the data high or low becomes extensive. In situations involving possible 
abuse of dominance or illegal horizontal agreements however, the question becomes more complex, 
but can possibly be solved by looking at previous historical transactions and comparing how many of 
the data synergies and capabilities where then identified, and now applicable to the situation at hand.  
The consequences of this would be that two companies that offers digital services to the customer side 
which both has a low market shares, could in fact be large actors on the data-as-input side of the 
market.170 If guidance is used from past acquisitions, the hidden value of these companies may become 
more apparent. Furthermore, transaction pricing thresholds would only apply when one company has 
the financial means of making an offer for acquisition that exceeds the threshold, but not be applicable 
for deals actors with little financial strength but with considerable data assets.  
4.2.1.4. Generated revenue 
Similar to the method of looking retrospectively at conducted M&A deals, insight to the value of data 
can be learned from how well it can be turned into profit. Inge Graef discusses this as a method of 
discovering the competitive strength of actors that are active in the market for data,171 but I believe 
that the method can be equally as useful for constructing the price of data that enables the definition 
of the relevant market for data.  
By looking at the annual turnover from a product or service enabled by data, traditional valuation 
methods can be used to reach a reasonable price for the company in the case of an acquisition (for 
instance, using a multiple of the revenue or a discounted cash flow technique). This can be adjusted in 
relation to what additional investments are required to enable the generation of revenue, such as 
hardware and expertise.  
This technique becomes effective when used to assess the price tag of mature companies with steady 
operations, but less so in the case of companies not yet generating revenue – as was the case with 
WhatsApp prior to the Facebook acquisition. It becomes even more problematic when the product or 
                                                          
169 Berg and Weinert, Transaction-value merger threshold soon to be in force in Germany – update on the 9th 
ARC revision  
170 This possibility is mentioned in: Vestager, Big data and competition 
171 Graef, Market definition and market power in data, p. 502 
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service is offered for free, and the founders of the company are intent on being acquired due to their 
user base or data asset.  
4.2.2. Demand substitutability of data 
The troubles with discerning a golden method for determining the price of data is caused by the same 
thing that makes assessments of demand substitutability regarding the price of data so difficult, 
namely that the instrumental value of data is dependent on the capabilities of the company controlling 
it. Therefore, the substitutability in terms of price becomes problematic, as the field of use of data is 
highly varying.  
Product characteristics and intended use are insufficient to show whether two products are demand 
substitutes, and other criteria of substitutability must be considered.172 One such criteria is the barriers 
and costs associated with switching demand to potential substitutes, which on the one hand is highly 
relevant in the case of companies using data as an input, but on the other hand barren when it comes 
to finding relevant case law. For instance, the reasoning of the Commission in Tetrapak as to the 
switching costs is hard to transpose into a digital context: when faced with shifting from the production 
of non-aseptic to aseptic milk cartons, the need for complex technology to manufacture the necessary 
machinery demonstrated a sufficient lack of interchangeability.173 
The Commission’s notice on the definition of relevant market does clearly state that it is not possible 
to provide an exhaustive list of barriers to substitution and of switching costs, but gives as an example 
costs in learning and human capital investments.174 
If for instance a business is combining two different sets of data to enable its commercial offering, the 
qualities of the respective data sets dictate the level of substitutability of the other: a German post 
order company that cross-references street addresses with weather forecasts would for instance not 
be able to substitute its collected personal data with personal data from people in the same 
demography, but different geography (such as for instance, Argentinian e-shoppers).   
4.2.2.1. Price sensitivity 
As it comes to price, the company reliant on a specific stream or supply of data is subject to being in a 
weak bargaining position due to the lack of viable alternatives. Often, a company is founded on the 
basis of a singular business idea, which in the case for data entrepreneurs is an identified opportunity 
in regards of a source of data (such as in the case of Bumbee Labs, being able to collect information 
about visitors to physical venues using wifi).175 The elasticity of demand, in other words what the 
company is willing to pay for the data, becomes very high as there are presumable none or few viable 
alternatives to the data upon which the company is dependent, once the company is up and running.  
As it is common for startups to operate with losses in their initial phase, and to be dependent on 
continual investments from parties that believe that the startup shows promise of future prosperity, 
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one can expect that a critical aspect of the investor’s vetting of the startup is the stability of the data 
source upon which it relies. If the startup subsequently faces an increase in supply price of its necessary 
data, the decision to “pull the plug” will ultimately be made by the investor and not the founders of 
the startup, meaning that it is of no significance if the company itself could be willing to pay virtually 
any price to keep its supply of data secure. Therefore, it becomes very hard to use the price sensitivity 
as an indication for substitutability of data for a company.  
4.2.2.2. Use 
Broad categories of use, as subsets to the market of data, can be identified from European merger 
decisions and from a basic typology of existing companies that utilise big data. It has been suggested 
that the functionality enabled by the different kinds of data are correlated to the business solutions in 
which they are utilised: search data, social network data, and e-commerce data.176 This would mean 
that distinct putative input markets could be modelled upon this categorisation.  
I believe that it is a good start, and that is certainly has confirmation in both case law and practice, but 
that it must be recognised as only a start and not as a final solution. Future competitive analysis must 
be flexible to adapt to the situations at hand, and be conscious that innovation and unexpected cross-
breeding of information is what will shape the market in the future. It is difficult to predict how the 
use of data will evolve in the future, and as brought up to attention in the Microsoft/LinkedIn merger 
decision “there is not one dataset with the highest value [as input for machine learning], but that it is 
about having numerous types of data.”177 Therefore, stereotypical contemporary ideas of data should 
not be allowed to dictate future competitive assessments in terms of market definition.  
4.2.3. Supply substitutability in terms of the use of the data 
As for supply side substitutability, it may be taken into account in situations where its effects are 
equivalent to those of demand substitution in terms of effectiveness and immediacy, meaning in 
practice that suppliers can switch to produce the relevant products and market them in short time so 
as to compete with the undertaking in question.178 Most typically, these situations arise when 
companies market a range of qualities and grades of one product.179  
For the sake of defining the relevant market for data, the idea that if there is only one actor producing 
the data in question and that there consequently is no market for it, can be countered by the proving 
the existence of another actor that can readily and easily switch to producing the data in question. For 
data, the supply side substitutability can be described as one-sided.  
The TomTom/Tele Atlas merger raised interesting questions about the substitutability of data when it 
has been packaged in the form of a product (as a navigable digital map database), as the Commission 
found that on the demand side, higher quality data can be substituted for lower quality data, but not 
vice versa. Similarly, on the supply side, a producer of high quality data can easily switch to producing 
low quality data, but not vice versa.180 This is what I call a one-sided substitutability.  
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In order to effectively collect large amounts of personal data, there have to be an incentive for the 
consumer that outweighs any reluctance of sharing the data (as mentioned in 4.2.1.1 (Users’ consent 
as payment). This could for instance be a useful service, a unique and high quality product, or a 
platform in the position of enjoying a strong network effect. One could safely assume that if any of 
these would be possible to achieve easily without significant costs of capital and time, someone would 
already have done it and alternatives would exist. The market can be assumed to be saturated, creating 
difficult obstacles for new entrants to overcome. 
4.3. Conclusions 
A hypothetical market for data as an input could surely be defined in cases involving an abuse of a 
dominant position, and probably also as a component in merger reviews. In the former case, demand 
for the product on the hypothetical market would be certain and that would be enough to justify the 
use of a hypothetical market, whereas in the latter case the market dynamics are of greater importance 
– thus requiring the model of the hypothetical market to be more detailed.  
Constructing the details of the hypothetical market for data as an input is encumbered by difficulties, 
such as ascertaining the price of data. Doing so forces one to look at its other characteristics, including 
“intended” use. As there is no “intended” use for data this becomes very hard. The only characteristic 
of data that can be said to vary is what information it carriers.  
The question of substitutability for the user of the data as input (the demand substitutability) becomes 
very hard to approach, as businesses can be assumed to be built upon an identified opportunity to be 
exploited, rather than based on a given activity that the business owners wishes to pursue. 
Furthermore, the business might be dependent on two or more sets of data that is combined or 
otherwise modified to provide the output of the business – this can lead to one input of data dictating 
the specifications of the other input of data. Due to this opportunity-dependency, the possibilities to 
change the supply of data becomes unrealistic as the scope of useful replacement data becomes very 
narrow. 
Even if only one actor supplies a certain type of data at a given point in time, it is possible that other 
actors could enter the supply market if the economic incentives for doing so presented themselves. 
For this to be realistic, they must presently hold data of an equally or higher level of quality than what 
is demanded by the potential customers, so that they can offer existing or downgraded data without 
investing in means to establish a means of collecting the data in question. Given the level of 
concentration in markets characterised by the presence of digital platforms, there are few actors 
already present on the market with operations capable of serving these needs.  
The purpose of defining a hypothetical market for data as an input would be to have a tool for assessing 
the market structure and competitive forces on the market.181 The primary conclusion that can be 
drawn from the analysis in this chapter is that the market structure and competitive forces shaped by 
data are very different from those of “traditional” (physical) markets.  
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Despite this, data cannot be completely de-coupled from the products or services it enables, as this 
could lead to results that are deceptive of the state of competition on the market: for instance, the 
merger thresholds become ineffective, or the HHI becomes skewed.  
5. Assessing market power in markets for data 
To establish the division of market power in a market, that market must be defined. The primary way 
of establishing the market shares for each supplier is to calculate it on the basis of their “sales” (of 
data, in this case). Both the volume and value of sales are used. Additional methods depend on the 
specific industry or products in question, such as e.g. units of fleet (aerospace industry) or reserves 
held (mining products).182  
Given the difficulties with A) defining a market for data, and B) finding quantitative information in it, 
the preconditions for a classical assessment of market power in the hypothetical market for data as an 
input are not at hand.  
Inge Graef discusses the problems with using a quantitative approach to the problem: an alternative 
but still objective method would be to use the revenue of the undertaking in question as an indication 
of its ability to monetise the data, in consequence using the companies’ annual turnover as the key for 
attaining the relative market shares of them. This approach, however, presupposes that the 
undertaking is not offering its products or services for free or otherwise has multisided nature where 
the subsidy of one side’s access to the products or services are made up for by the revenues generated 
from the other side. This was the case with WhatsApp, Inge Graef explains, and points to the fact that 
the “real” product market (consumer communication services) was used by the Commission in the 
merger decision. Graef’s approach does however not, to the extent of my understanding, describe 
what numbers the company’s turnover would be compared with. The relevant market could be 
composed of either other providers of substitutable data through licensing, other deliverers of 
targeted advertising services, or other products or services having data as its input. 183 In my opinion, 
this approach does not expose the market dynamics generated by data.   
Two scenarios can be drawn up where data is the centre of a competitive assessment: A) is where the 
data in question can be deemed as adequately substitutable between actors, such as for instance 
personal data pertaining to e-consumers; and B) where the data is held by only one undertaking and 
not traded with or having any viable alternatives on the “market”. A quantitative value/volume 
approach as suggested by Graef is possible to use in the former case, but not the latter. 
Therefore, in the cases of B), other indicators of market power must be used. This entails a detailed 
assessment of what data the undertaking controls in terms of type and quality, which must be 
considered in relation to the nature of the undertaking’s business model. As can be seen in Appendix 1, 
the characteristics of the big data eco-system is complex and involves many businesses at different 
levels, interacting with each other on often multisided markets.  
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5.1. An approach based on the big data value chain  
The think-tank CERRE (Centre on Regulation in Europe) suggests that competition authorities “should 
keep a broad view taking into account the main characteristics of the eco-system and the relationship 
between markets”, where the main characteristics includes: the presence of direct and indirect 
network effects; that the relationship between the different markets that are often multi-sided in 
nature; and the rate of innovation, which is often unpredictable and disruptive.184 Furthermore, multi-
homing and the “experience curve” of self-learning algorithms are suggested as characteristics that 
should be considered, but I am personally sceptical towards these factors: the latter is a technically 
specific aspect of the economies of scale (thresholds), and the former is discussed below in Appendix 1 
and by me deemed to not have a significant impact to be given so much consideration in a competition 
assessment.  
The essence of CERRE’s approach is to look at the first and last “steps” of the big data value chain 
(collection and analysis, respectively) and assess how they affect each other.  
5.1.1. Data collection 
Data as a non-rival goods185 is modified by a number of factors, which CERRE concludes are either 
technical, legal, or contractual in nature. These factors affect the availability of data. The question then 
comes to whether the data is replicable and thus not constituting a restriction on competition, which 
the Commission has found in a number of cases concerning data-rich undertakings.186 This is 
contrasted with examples of (national) competition cases where the data was deemed non-replicable, 
as the result of it having been gathered during a legal monopoly.187 
What is missing in this – otherwise useful – structuring of methodology, is the fact that an additional 
restraint upon the availability of data is constituted by practical constraints on the side of the end-
user: a person can only participate in so many social networks at the time, and shop so many shoes or 
ties per month – in consequence the “supply” of demand is constant and to a large degree rival, thus 
constituting a practical restriction on data collection. An example of an ambitious attempt at displacing 
Facebook as dominant social media platform is Google’s own platform Google+, which failed to 
amount a critical mass of users to be held as a general success – one of the reasons for which was that 
people were already participating in one big social network and had little need for another one. Data 
that can be considered replicable, such as data collected from Facebook, may in effect not be replicable 
due to the strong user loyalty towards Facebook and disinclination to share the same information on 
other places.  
5.1.2. Data analysis  
The analysis of data is dependent on the quality of the data at hand, and the capability to analyse it. 
The quality of the data can be said to be affected by the economies of scale and scope.188  
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188 See Appendix 1 for elaboration. 
51 
 
Economies of scale has been analysed in depth in regards of search engines in the merger decision of 
Microsoft / Yahoo! Business Search. The question was of the relative impact additional search queries 
have on the quality of the search engine overall, where infrequent and unique search strings (so-called 
“tail queries”) can be argued to play a significant part in this.189 Economies of scope was discussed in 
the Google / DoubleClick merger decision, where the Commission noted that not only the size of the 
volume of data matters, but also by the different types of it.190 Furthermore, as my analysis in 
4.1.2 (Summary of case evidence and support for a data-as-input market) shows, the importance of 
the type of data has clearly been identified by the Commission on a number of occasions.  
I agree with CERRE in their conclusion that the extent of the economies of scale and scope are empirical 
questions which should be tested in each case on the basis of the type of data and application at 
hand.191 
5.1.3. The relationship between collection and analysis of data 
CERRE concludes that there are several parts of the big data value chain that are interrelated and that 
there may be feedback loops between the collection and analysis of data, which increases the 
efficiency in the former.  
Two particular feedback loops are suggested: 1) the user feedback loop; and 2) the monetisation 
feedback loop. In the former, an increase in the number of users is supposed to enable an increase in 
the quality of the service, thus attracting more users. In the latter, a 2SP is presupposed where the 
increase in user data enables better advertisement services, yielding more revenue from this which 







Again, CERRE concludes that the existence and 
intensity of feedback loops needs to be tested on a 
case-by-case basis.192 
One must note that the models proposed by CERRE are 
made with online advertising services specifically in 
mind, but despite this I think that the frameworks 
suggested are clear and concise and captures the 
essence of the problems that the competition authorities and courts need to consider when assessing 
                                                          
189 COMP/M.5727 – Microsoft/ Yahoo! search business, paras. 162 and 223 
190 COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick, para. 273 
191 CERRE, pp. 33-34 
192 CERRE, pp. 35-37 
Figure 2 - feedback loop 1 (source: CERRE, p. 35) 
Figure 3 - feedback loop 2 (source: CERRE, p. 36) 
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qualitative market power in the data economy: what feedback loops exists, and what happens if they 
are left un-checked?  
In its recent decision on abuse of dominance by Google, the Commission used (2) the monetisation 
feedback loop in tandem with (1) the user feedback loop (for data) as support that there are high 
barriers to entry into the market of online search.193 
5.2. An approach based on potential competition  
An alternative approach to assessing market power is by studying the effects on potential competition 
on incumbent undertakings. Inge Graef (who also co-authored the CERRE report) argues that 
competition authorities and courts should look to this as a proxy for dominance, in absence of 
quantitative means of assessing the market power.194 
With examples from the merger decisions in Microsoft/Skype, Cisco, and Facebook/WhatsApp, Graef 
points to the fact that the Commission is increasingly taking potential competition into consideration 
when assessing dominance in dynamic markets, as seen in the below exempt from the 
Facebook/WhatsApp decision:195  
“[the] Commission notes that the consumer communications sector is a recent and fast-
growing sector which is characterised by frequent market entry and short innovation 
cycles in which large market shares may turn out to be ephemeral. In such a dynamic 
context, the Commission takes the view that in this market high market shares are not 
necessarily indicative of market power and, therefore, of lasting damage to 
competition.”196 
Following Graef’s article, which was published in 2015, her opinions were affirmed by the Commission 
in the Microsoft/LinkedIn merger decision of late 2016:  
“the combination of two datasets post-merger may increase the merged entity's market 
power in a hypothetical market for the supply of this data or increase barriers to 
entry/expansion in the market for actual or potential competitors, which may need this 
data to operate on this market. Competitors may indeed be required to collect a larger 
dataset in order to compete effectively with the merged entity than absent the merger”197 
Graef suggests four aspects which may indicate that a power advantage due to control over data is in 
play: 1) data is a significant input; 2) the incumbents rely on IP protection of their data; 3) there are no 
reasonable substitutes to the data available; 4) it is not viable for a competitor to collect the data 
themselves.198  
                                                          
193 “[T]he more consumers use a search engine, the more attractive it becomes to advertisers. The profits 
generated can then be used to attract even more consumers. Similarly, the data a search engine gathers about 
consumers can in turn be used to improve results.”: Press release, Antitrust: Commission fines Google €2.42 billion 
for abusing dominance as search engine by giving illegal advantage to own comparison shopping service 
194 Graef, Market definition and market power in data, p. 502 
195 Graef, Market definition and market power in data, p. 503 
196 COMP/M.7217 – Facebook / WhatsApp, para. 99, citing Case T-79/12 Cisco Systems Inc v Commission [2013], 
paragraph 69 
197 Case No COMP/M.8124 – Microsoft / LinkedIn, para. 179 
198 Inge Graef, ‘Market definition and market power in data’, World competition, 38, no. 4, 2015, p. 504 
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Aspects 3 and 4, of substitutability and replicability, are non-problematic and similar to the what CERRE 
discusses in in the collection phase of their market power assessment method. Aspect 1 is at first sight 
uncomplicated as it seems like a reasonable first criteria, but it begs the question what “significant” in 
this situation means. The second aspect may indeed serve as empirical evidence that data collection is 
made difficult for the competitors, and should as such be applied when possible and considered a 
supplement to factors 3 and 4, but it is important that the absence of IP protection should not be taken 
as a sign of lack of market power (regarding the difficulties with protecting data, see Appendix 2).  
In my opinion, there are significant overlap between the four aspects, and it can be argued that the 
fourth aspects in itself include the other three, and is therefore the crucial one: if competitors cannot 
realistically collect the data themselves they cannot enter the market and compete with the 
incumbents, which is a strong indication that the incumbents are dominant on the market. In principle, 
a high market share in a market of data would then imply dominance per default.  
5.3. Conclusion 
The theoretical validity of both approaches discussed above have been confirmed by the Commission, 
but in different contexts. The logic of CERRE’s approach was used by the Commission in a case of abuse 
of dominance in the online search market, just like the scenario that CERRE discussed, whereas Graef’s 
logic of potential competition was mentioned in the Microsoft/LinkedIn merger. What both 
approaches have in common is that the core of their arguments is that barriers to entry can be a source 
of market power.  
However, discerning what is an intentional barrier to entry and what is a well-functioning company is 
difficult. Attributing market power to a company due to the barriers to entry to compete with it could 
also be described as protecting the competitors rather than the competition itself.  
Another possible avenue of critique of using the barriers of entry to divine market power is that it 
jumbles the sequential order of the competitive assessment. A merger review or investigation of abuse 
of dominance is initiated due to concerns that an entity has enough market power to be considered 
dominant, findings of barriers to entry would be easy, and they would reinforce the notion of 
dominance – the competitive assessment would thus become something of a self-fulfilling prophecy 
(and even more so if the barriers of entry is a component of the theory of harm). One of the clues to 
the existence of market power would also be used as evidence for it, which would jeopardize the 
quality of the competitive assessment.  
Another common factor with both approaches is that they make away with the need for a 
(hypothetical) market for data as an input (which was very hard to establish a definition of, as discussed 
in the previous chapter). However, where CERRE’s approach is good for certain situations it lacks the 
general applicability which Graef’s approach has. Both of them stresses the importance of evaluating 
each case on its own merits. This can certainly be said to be underlined by the different fields of 
application for the approaches.  
To make any conclusive last statement as to the assessment of market power thus becomes very hard, 
other than that it seems implausible to devise an approach which would be accurate and relevant for 
any situation at hand. Instead, perhaps the lesson to be learned is that the adherence to certain 
approaches or methods in fact could obscure the competitive assessment rather than help it.  
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6. Competitive assessment 
The Merger Regulation states that deals that would significantly impede effective competition are not 
compatible with the common market.199 Therefore, the analysis that is in the centre of a merger review 
is whether or not the deal in question would significantly impede effective competition, something 
which has come to be known as the SIEC test. 
The theory of harm guiding the SIEC test dictates that harm to the market must be supported by 
empirical evidence. As the counterfactual scenario used in this thesis is general and does not pertain 
to a particular merger or even a specification of one, empirical evidence is not possible to obtain and 
the discussion will instead be theoretical and based on the possibilities of obtaining such evidence, as 
discussed above.  
The SIEC test is explained in the guidelines on horizontal and non-horizontal mergers, in regards of 
specific scenarios such as the merger leading to foreclosure of inputs for competitors or the increased 
concentrations of market shares. These guidelines summarise the Commission’s approach to certain 
types of problems, and references previous decisions that illustrates how the conclusions have been 
reached.  
Overall, the guidelines (and the historical merger decisions from which the guidelines are derived) deal 
with markets where several actors operate and there is a measure of equilibrium between them that 
can be upset by the merger due to the rearrangement of sources of power, such as inputs for 
production or channels to the consumers. The primary concern is that consumers should not be 
harmed through increased prices or lack of technical development. However, the guidelines should 
not be construed as mere checklists to control if a merger is harmful to competition or not, but as 
collections of past decisions to support the making of new decisions. When assessing what future 
impact on competition has using historic material, it is important that the circumstances in the historic 
material is also relevant for the future scenario that is assessed. Since data and the digital economy is 
largely a recent development that changes the dynamics of the market, the connection with the old 
circumstances is becoming gradually weaker with the technical and economic development of 
society/the market.  
In this chapter I will discuss the theory of harm defined in chapter 2 in fine, and use the findings of 
chapters 3-5 as circumstances that will indicate if acquisitions of data-rich companies are compatible 
with the market (on a general level). The assessment will be performed in accordance with the 
guidelines on horizontal and non-horizontal mergers.  
6.1. Possible anti-competitive effects  
As discussed in 2.1.1 (Acquiring data, or pre-emptive M&A?), when incumbent undertakings acquire 
smaller firms they can be argued to reduce the potential for future competition. Acquisitions can be 
justified for many business strategic reasons, such as synergies between products or services having 
been identified, talent acquisition (“acquihires”) or other such interests. What is not openly disclosed 
is when the main reason for the acquisition, or part of it, is that the incumbent company wants to “nip 
the problem in the bud”. Since these reasons are not openly stated as rationales for acquisitions, it 
                                                          
199 Merger Regulation (139/2004/EC) art. 2.2 
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becomes hard to assess the impact of this strategy on potential competition as it uncertain what the 
incumbent’s motives really are and consequently to define what behaviour to examine.  
On the other hand, one might argue, the prospect of being able to get a substantial investment and 
possibly “making an exit” might incentivise and spur innovation. As stated in a discussion paper on 
exclusionary abuses of market dominance, not being able to exit a market is considered as deterring 
actors to enter into the market in the first place, thus reducing the overall competition. As such, when 
incumbents offer a “way out”, they can also be argued to accommodate for potential competition.  
In Microsoft/LinkedIn, the Commission considers the positive effects of acquisitions in situations where 
the assets held by the acquired party will be put to a more effective use of the merged entity, as it can 
allow for new products or improvements to existing products in the market, thus benefitting the 
consumers.  
A third facet of this situation, making it a trilemma, is that the legal framework for making effective 
licensing deals with data can be said to be wanting, leaving actors to complicated and convoluted 
contractual solutions. As data cannot readily be transmitted using “pipes”, it becomes a more viable 
option to “package it in a box” and send the box – i.e. to acquire the company rather than enter data 
sharing deals with it (see Appendix 2). 
6.1.1. Problems with defining if the merger is horizontal or vertical  
Horizontal mergers take place between actual or potential competitors on the same market.  
Therefore, the applicability of the horizontal guidelines becomes contingent on how the market for 
data is defined. If a definition that treats data as an input is used, any acquisition of a company that 
generates data that is substitutable with that “produced” of the acquiring company could potentially 
be seen as a horizontal merger. In regards of personal data, this means that the scope of horizontal 
mergers becomes very wide as services with different functionalities could still be competitors if they 
generate data that deemed interchangeable by a downstream third party, or in other words enable 
the same functionalities (such as for instance increase the efficiency of targeted advertising).  
Therefore, horizontal mergers concerning the collection of data becomes achingly close to vertical 
conglomerate mergers, which are defined as mergers between companies whose relationship is 
neither horizontal nor vertical, but whose products are placed in closely related markets.200 
Classical vertical mergers are easier to identify, as they are characterised by supply line integration. An 
example of this was the case when TomTom acquired TeleAtlas with the purpose to backwards 
integrate its supply chain. When data is sold as a commodity or product in specialised sectors such as 
navigation or finance, it is possible to treat it like an input using “traditional” methods described in the 
guidelines.  
6.1.2. Non-coordinated horizontal effects 
6.1.2.1. The elimination of an important competitive force  
The competitive force exerted by a company can be greater than what its market shares suggest. If the 
concentration involves two companies that are both innovators, the concentration could eliminate an 
                                                          
200 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 265/07), para. 5 
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important competitive force on and thus lead to a significant impediment on effective competition. 
This is particularly true in markets that are already concentrated.201 Not all concentrations are 
detrimental to competition, however, as the acquisition could increase the ability and incentive to 
innovate. In cases where the merging companies both have products that are targeting the same part 
of the market, and one company acquires the other, it would be detrimental to competition as it is 
generally seen that two competing products on a market is better than one without competition.202 
For a merger to raise serious competition concerns it is necessary to show that the potential 
competitor acts a significant competitive restraint or that would grow to become one if it would not 
be acquired. The higher the concentration in the market, the more likely that the company would grow 
to become one. In addition, it must be established that there are not enough actual or potential 
competitors to maintain the necessary competitive pressure after the merger. This is dependent on 
inter alia the existence of barriers to entry that are high enough to exclude other potential 
competitors.203 
Consumer harm from impediments to innovation is hard to find convincing evidence for, as no 
difference in quality of innovations created “in-house” in large companies can be discerned from 
“independent” innovation created in small startups. The difference between the two is best described 
as the dichotomy between a Schumpeterian model of innovation that states that concentrated 
markets foster innovation the best, and a Arrowian model claiming that contested markets are best 
suited for fostering competition. The Union’s utilisation of Shapiro’s unified theory has most 
prominently been used in the pharmaceutical sector where the results of innovation are inherently 
connected to the health of consumers204 (the use of this model is logical, since pharma companies are 
reliant on their next product to reap enough benefits to pay the costs of its development: for them it 
is a matter of innovate or perish). In a data-dependent setting (TomTom/TeleAtlas) the extent of 
consumer benefit from increased capabilities for innovation was not explored fully as the transaction 
lacked strong enough anti-competitive effects to warrant such an inquiry,205 and there are no other 
indications of the Commission’s attitude towards consumer benefit from data-dependent innovation.  
In Facebook/WhatsApp, the Commission assumed that companies innovate to procure a large user 
base,206 and that the consumer communications market is sensitive to disruption caused by 
innovation,207 thus hinting of an inclination towards a Schumpeterian model of competition (creative 
destruction). 
Personally, I believe that the Arrowian model better describes innovation in the data-context, as big 
companies such as Google and Facebook are not reliant on periodical big product launches which must 
be successful (such as hardware manufacturers as Apple and Samsung are, similar to pharma-
companies). Rather, as described in chapter 5 regarding the feedback loops, Google and Facebook 
continually improve their existing products or services using data and do not launch entirely new 
                                                          
201 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03), para. 37 
202 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03), para. 38 
203 EU merger control and innovation, p. 3 
204 COMP/M.7275 - Novartis/Glaxosmithkline Oncology Business; COMP/M.7559 - Pfizer/Hospira;  
205 COMP/M.4854 - TomTom/Tele Atlas, paras. 248 and 250 
206 COMP/M.7217 – Facebook / WhatsApp, para. 87 
207 COMP/M.7217 – Facebook / WhatsApp, para. 116 
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products periodically. When looking at Google, it is not clear if the company’s prominent position in 
the market stems from its superior knowledge in data science or if rather it is fortunate timing that led 
to it.208 Considering this reasonable doubt of whether the incumbents’ positions are explainable by 
virtue of their superior ability to innovate, and that their incentive to innovate would only be to stay 
relevant enough to not be disrupted, the Schumpeterian model would wrongly attribute them an 
innovative power which they do not have. As such, innovation would rather benefit from a market 
with more actors and market power less concentrated, thus confirming the Arrowian model.  
Therefore, the acquisition of potential competitors does not necessarily increase or maintain the 
overall level of innovative output on the market, it could effectively drain the market from innovators. 
6.1.2.2. Entry of new competitors as a competitive restraint 
If entering the market is sufficiently easy, the merger is unlikely to pose any significant risk to the 
functioning of the market. For entry of new competitors to be considered a sufficient competitive 
constraint on the merging parties, it must be shown to be likely, timely and sufficient to deter or defeat 
any potential anti-competitive effects of the merger.209 
In the context of my theory of harm, it must be admitted that the barriers to entry are most likely to 
arise from access to data, which is largely governed by network effects and feedback loops. This was 
confirmed in the Commission’s decision on Google’s abuse of dominance, as mentioned earlier.210 The 
discussion about substitutability of data is mainly useful for determining if the potential barriers to 
entry at hand are relevant and applicable for the potential competitors. Depending on how narrowly 
the market for data is defined, the “height” of the barriers to entry varies, as narrow definitions of the 
market for data means that potential competitors are assumed to have less viable alternatives for 
obtaining their data, thus making the barriers to entry higher.   
To ensure merger decisions of the highest quality, the definition of the market for data thus becomes 
crucial. If this market should be defined teleologically from the specifications of technologies with 
varying technology readiness levels using the counterfactual method suggested by the guidelines on 
horizontal technology transfer,211 or if the market should be defined accordingly to how data is used 
and shared at the present day, becomes a crucial question.  
In the end, the likelihood of the entry of new rivals must be said to be overall low. Additionally, it is 
not likely that a new entrant would be a sufficient enough restraint on the incumbents, as market entry 
would most likely be small-scale and in a niche market as a first step to scale up from.212 If a new entry 
                                                          
208 The chief scientist of Google at the time suggests that "[w]e don't have better algorithms than anyone else. 
We just have more data.": Matt Asay, Tim O'Reilly: 'Whole Web' is the OS of the future, Cnet [online] 18 March 
2010, https://www.cnet.com/news/tim-oreilly-whole-web-is-the-os-of-the-future/ (accessed 11 July 2017); 
about the fortuitous timing of Silicon Valley companies, see: Pasquale, pp. 87-88  
209 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03), para. 68 
210 Unfortunately, at the time of writing the full decision has not yet been published and the Commission’s 
reasoning cannot be analysed in depth.  
211 When it comes to defining the relevant market for R&D agreements, careful attention must be paid not only 
to the existing product and technology markets affected by the R&D collaboration, but also to the possible 
situations that might arise – i.e. new products that create entirely new product markets: Guidelines on the 
applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation 
agreements (2011/C 11/01), para. 112 
212 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03), para. 75 
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on the other hand would be sufficient in scale to actually be a constraint on competition, it is 
unfortunately likely that it would be swift enough to be a realistic response to the merger or post-
merger entity’s actions – the guidelines state that entry within two years is timely, but in my opinion 
it is uncertain if such a timespan is realistic to use in the digital sector.213 
6.1.2.3. Customers have limited possibilities of switching supplier 
If customers of the merging parties have difficulties switching to other suppliers because there are few 
alternatives or the switching costs are prohibitive, the consumers are particularly vulnerable to price 
increases.214  
As can be seen in Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram, WhatsApp and Snapchat, the few viable 
alternative social media platforms in terms of user base that customers have had was absorbed into 
Facebook. This has left customers vulnerable to price increases from Facebook, be it economical price 
increases such as for instance increasing the importance of sponsoring posts to reach out to audiences, 
or be it terms of use and privacy policies that are less respectful of the user’s privacy. Due to the 
network effect of users, enabled or empowered by feedback effects enabled by market dominance, it 
is unlikely that customers would switch to other suppliers.  
However, consumer harm in this regard is based on increases in price, where effective competition is 
conjectured with low prices.215 In markets where the end consumer is offered a product or service free 
of charge in return for a subscription, the (economic) price is zero, which means that unless consumers 
are faced with a price increase no consumer harm can be established (one example of this would be 
having to pay to be seen by using sponsored posts on Facebook – but even then, when does consumer 
have the “right” to be seen on Facebook?). Suggestions that the quality of the free products can be of 
importance, such as for instance in regards of the level of privacy the consumers enjoy,216 have been 
effectively rejected by the Commission in it is remark in the Facebook/WhatsApp decision that privacy 
is not a competition concern.217 Typically, sufficient lack of quality of the product is something that 
would make consumers switch to other alternatives, but due to the power of network effects in social 
media consumers have demonstrated high tolerance in regards of changes of the product they use.218   
To make this question even more complex, the forthcoming GDPR gives data subjects the right to data 
portability, which means that data controllers are obliged to provide data subjects the data they have 
provided the controller in a structured, commonly used, machine-readable and interoperable format, 
and to transmit this to another controller if the data subject so requests.219 Regardless of the intended 
Chinese wall between competition law and data protection, it is highly likely that the right to data 
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portability could decrease the barriers to entry into data markets dependent on personal data. 
Therefore, conclusive statements about consumer switching should not be made until the impact of 
the GDPR can be assessed.  
Nevertheless, it is probable that the lock-in of consumers into social media platforms effectively seizes 
part of the market and leaves competitors competing over the “left-overs”. This means that the data 
market for social media users is largely not contestable, and that companies in it will have problems 
with accessing the data they need to develop their products and services, to the detriment of 
innovation in the field.  
6.1.3. Vertical non-coordinated effects: foreclosure  
When acquisitions result in hampering or elimination of potential competitors’ access to supplies or 
markets and therefore reduces their ability and/or incentive to compete, it is said to result in 
foreclosure. Foreclosure is anti-competitive when competitors are disadvantaged from it and the 
merging companies are able to profitably increase the price charged to consumers.220 Input foreclosure 
is only relevant if it concerns an important input for a downstream product.221 
When the new entity is capable of restricting access to products or services, post-merger, that would 
have otherwise been available to competitors, input foreclosure is at hand. The important question 
then becomes “had the data been available to competitors, prior to the transaction?”.  
The answer to this question would most likely be no, since there is no effective market for data. On 
the one hand, the data was – prior to the merger – available to competitors, but probably not by means 
of a data sharing deal, but by ways of acquiring the whole company. On the other hand, such a 
transaction to acquire the data would require considerable time and resources which the potential 
non-dominant buyer most likely does not have. Therefore, the answer to the question can be answered 
affirmingly, the data was available to everyone, but only a few actors had the means of buying it. Since 
it never was realistic for competitors to access the data, the situation cannot be described as a 
conventional input foreclosure.  
Unless the acquired company’s business is to sell data, such as in TomTom/TeleAtlas, the discussion of 
input foreclosure becomes disengaged from the legal doctrine of the Union and instead becomes 
speculative in regards of the potential of data as an input. The doctrine of essential inputs have been 
put forward as a possible way of mitigating data-access issues, as compulsory licenses could help to 
open up the market and to foster innovation, but it is impossible to construct a single doctrine that 
can be applied uniformly to all sectors of the digital industry.222 Such an approach, however, requires 
that the refusal to deal (i.e. input foreclosure) is the consequence of a company’s abuse of its dominant 
position and thus falls outside of the scope of this thesis.  
In regards of barriers to entry, the acquisition of a data company that is upstream from a potential 
entrant could force the entrant to also be forced to enter the upstream market to effectively compete 
on the market – i.e. the potential entrant must find its own source of data. This raises barriers to entry 
                                                          
220 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
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which could potentially impede the impact of potential competition,223 but again, considering the 
unlikeliness of smaller actors establishing access to data that can compete with the dominant actors 
in the market, this concern becomes largely theoretical. 
In the Facebook/WhatsApp merger decision, the Commission focuses the analysis of the merged 
entity’s ability to foreclose on access to the final user on the mobile device, stating that neither party 
has control over the points of entry (mobile operating system, identifiers to connect users, and address 
books) meaning that the transaction as such is unlikely to affect competition.224 In my view, this 
approach is somewhat short-sighted as it fails to account for aggregation of users into an eco-system 
of offerings that compels other users to also participate in that particular network, effectively 
constituting a barrier to entry for competitors. Building a communications app was deemed by the 
Commission to be “fairly easy”,225 but if you build it – will they come? 
If there are enough credible downstream competitors that are themselves vertically integrated (in this 
case, having their own access to the data), the competition they exert on the merged entity may be a 
sufficient constraint to prevent output prices from rising.  
6.2. The ability and incentives of the dominant firm to harm competition 
Regarding the would-be input foreclosure of post-merger entities, the distinction between ability to 
foreclose and incentive to foreclose becomes largely academic as “foreclosure” is the default of the 
market, which is upheld by the company automatically unless it decides to actively share its data. 
Therefore, the question of input foreclosure as competitive harm should be assessed in the context of 
TFEU art. 102 as an exclusionary conduct, rather than be dealt with using the Merger Regulation.  
As for the elimination of potential competitors, the ability of the dominant firms to remove potential 
competitors from the market is evident, as can be seen from the track records of acquisitions made by 
Facebook and Google for instance. The incentive to do so is also easy to articulate: the fear of being 
disrupted and losing market shares could very well be a contributing reason to various acquisitions 
made by incumbents – but on the other hand these acquisitions can also be expected to be justifiable 
from a business perspective. It is however sufficient that the incentive is plausible, as proving its 
existence would be close to impossible.  
6.3. Defences 
The solution to the abovementioned problem of finding the true incentive of the company can be 
solved by assessing what claims of increased efficiency of the market that the company brings forward. 
If the claim is substantiated, the Commission must assess it.226 
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If the consumers will be no worse off as a result from the merger, it should not be held as incompatible 
with the market.227 If consumers benefits from new or improved products or services as a result of 
R&D and innovation, it is also viewed as an efficiency gain.228 This defence has not been tried in a data-
heavy merger review by the Commission, but it should be reasonably easy for a company to show how 
its past history of acquisitions have enabled the state of its product or service as of today.229 In Google/ 
DoubleClick, the Commission acknowledges that the market (for provision of online advertising and 
intermediation of online advertising) has evolved into a state where “bundle competition” is the new 
ordinary:230 i.e. that several services are bundled together into a single offering, something which 
suggests a high level of acceptance of the Commission towards concentration of assets. The question 
essentially becomes if the dominant company’s R&D and innovation output is greater than the 
combined whole of a competitive market, which is not feasible for this thesis to answer, but this much 
can be concluded: that if a competitive market is not considered to be a better source of innovation 
than a natural monopoly, we will most likely continue to see Facebook and Google as the dominant 
actors for a long time to come.  
Another way for a company to justify a merger is by using the “failing firm defense”, which means that 
the market will not be harmed from the merger because the acquired firm would be forced out of the 
market in the near future due to financial difficulties, if it is not taken over by another company.231 
Seeing as many startups are operating at a loss during in their initial stages and are dependent on 
external funding, this defence could likely be invoked by the merging entities. Such claims could 
however be rebutted by pointing to the fact that seeking investments is a part of a startup’s business 
and should not qualify it as a “failing firm” – only if it can be shown that investment opportunities in 
the startup has been passed over by the majority of investors available, can the merger be said to 
“save” the failing firm and thus be assumed to have no negative impact on the competition on the 
market.  
6.4. Conclusion of the SIEC test 
As have been shown, the competition on the market for data can be impeded by acquisitions that 
concentrates the market and further raises the barriers to entry to it, but the connection between the 
concentration and consumer harm is not obvious and hard to find economic evidence for.  
Whilst it might be argued that concentration of data market shares raise the barriers to entry, it is also 
in this regard hard to find compelling evidence that it would lead to consumer harm in the form of 
increased prices or lack of innovation. Therefore, my theory of harm cannot be said to supported by 
                                                          
227 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03), para. 79 
228 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03), para. 81 
229 The functions of Facebook, for instance, is the result of several acquisitions: Octazen was used for the 
FriendFinder; Divvyshot for Facebook photos; ShareGrove for Facebook Groups; Hot Potato for the check-in 
functionality: see List of mergers and acquisitions by Facebook, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_mergers_and_acquisitions_by_Facebook [online] (accessed 7 July 2017) 
230 COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick, para. 327 
231 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03), paras. 89-90 
62 
 
the SIEC test, and my conclusion is consequently that concentrations of data market shares cannot be 
said to generally constitute a competition problem.  
7. Conclusions 
7.1. Discussion of results 
Given the difficulties of ascertaining any significant impediments on competition arising from 
concentrations of data market shares, the exercise of establishing a hypothetical market for data as an 
input appears largely superfluous.  
In cases of straight-forward vertical mergers, the use of having defined a market for data will then be 
mostly that it allows for the identification of deals that can affect the supply chains of data, as the 
analysis of the inputs of supply can be made with the methods already available which has also been 
tried and tested by the ECJ. 
If a different threshold model is used for determining the scope of the Merger Regulation that would 
include more “small” companies into the auspices of merger control, such as using transaction size or 
(data) market shares, the SIEC test would most likely not indicate that the concentration would be 
incompatible with the market. In its current form, the definition of a market for data has no particular 
effect on the scope of the merger review as annual turnover and possession of data does not have to 
be correlated – therefore, the definition of the market for data can only be of use for establishing 
market shares once the merger review is triggered by a notification (which could possibly include good 
faith notifications).  
If a merger assessment is initiated, having a defined market for data could prove useful for bringing to 
attention aspects that might otherwise have been lost if a “traditional” product-centric definition had 
been used. Such a market definition could very well be used in tandem with a conventional market 
definition. Given how few such cases would occur, it would be possible to make a detailed definition 
that is precisely tailored for the case at hand.  
Having a large amount of data in one’s possession or control does not pose a competition problem per 
se, neither by virtue of its power to distort the competition on the market (as controlled by the Merger 
Regulation) nor by its mere existence, unless its owner engages in conduct that is forbidden by TFEU 
art. 101 or 102.  
In the end, it is the volume of consumers and customers that indicate market power, which will always 
be evident from traditional economic and competition analysis. Therefore, a definition of the data 
market can at best be a compliment to competition analysis, but not a necessary tool that enables it 
completely or certain new aspects of it.  
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7.2. Discussion of research questions 
In this sub-section, the results of the thesis will be discussed 
in relation to the research questions (right) that have 
prompted it.  
1. This thesis has shown that a market for data cannot be 
defined, unless one is satisfied to use a hypothetical market 
for data as an input. This solution would make the flows of 
data and dependencies between companies more apparent 
in a competition assessment, but would be encumbered by 
the problem with affixing an objective value to data. Since the value of data is highly context-
dependent, finding an absolute value of it might be impossible. Whilst it is possible to define a market 
for data, doing so would at best lead to a market definition that inescapably would be contrived and 
of little practical use. 
2. Data is nevertheless a highly relevant aspect to consider in merger reviews, as the access to, control, 
and/or ownership of sources of data are increasingly important for companies to compete, and thus a 
determinant of the market dynamics. This in turn has high impact on the assessment of barriers to 
entry. 
3. It can be held that merger reviews must now at least consider the dimension of data in every 
assessment that is made, but that it can be attributed importance as is relevant for the case at hand. 
By having a defined a market for data, it becomes possible to ascertain market dynamics and which 
company in it that has what power, which are integral parts for the merger review. If the definition of 
the market for data is done from scratch in every case that is assessed, it is possible to attain more 
accurate and relevant results, but this could also lead to a higher degree of variation and 
unpredictability of the merger decisions. Nevertheless, in line with the increasingly dynamic and 
effects-based, less structuralist approach of the Commission towards competition assessments, the 
utility of having a pre-defined market ready on “stand-by” seems unrealistic and not desirable.  
4. As for the question of whether European competition law is capable of handling the digital economy, 
the answer cannot be reduced to a binary yes or no. While there is room for improvement in many 
regards, the problems are in my opinion not rooted in a systematic incompatibility between 
competition law and data. Neither does data constitute a new, never-before-seen phenomenon which 
competition law does not have the means to handle. The current state of competition law provides 
the ability for the Commission to draft decisions that are well-argued for and accurate for whatever 
case it is confronted with – the limiting factor is rather how knowledgeable the people involved with 
making the decision are. This should not be understood as a remark about the state of competence of 
anyone involved with the making of previous merger decisions, rather it should be interpreted as 
follows: data as a factor in competition assessments has only recently been brought into the spotlight 
as something important, and it is only natural that a period of learning is required before an expertise 
in handling data-related competition cases materialises and becomes evident in the published 
decisions. My conclusion is that we are currently finding ourselves in the later stage of this “digital 
infancy” of competition law, and that with the increased discussion and knowledge about data the 
quality of competition assessments concerning data will only become higher and higher. Therefore, I 
advocate trust in the dynamic and flexible application of competition law, and that cries for any 
1. How can a market for data be 
defined; 
2. how is data important in merger 
reviews;  
3. does it make any difference if there is 
a definition of a market for data; and 
4. is competition law currently capable 
of handling the digital economy? 
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(radical) change of the field of competition law are alarmistic and not compatible with the current legal 
framework for handling competition problems. 
As a point of learning, I believe that one of the main results with this thesis is that it shows that “we” 
(lawyers, judges, competition authority professionals, etc.) cannot in the case of data look to 
competition law and ask of it to tell us what to do, rather it is up to “us” to decide what we want to do 
in regards of data and competition and then explore if this is compatible with competition law. If not, 
it is a question of competition policy to induce changes in competition law that would enable the 
realisation of what “we” decided in regards of competition and data.   
7.3. Final remarks  
7.3.1. The Commission’s digital strategy and the European Data Economy 
In May 2015, the Digital Single Market Strategy was adopted and a vision to create a digital single 
market (“DSM”) was presented to the public.232 This market would be the digital counterpart of the 
existing (physical) single market, and it was prioritised to be one of the Union’s top ten political 
priorities.233 An important part of the DSM Strategy is to build a European “Data Economy”.234 
“The data economy is characterised by an ecosystem of different types of market players 
– such as data holders, researchers and infrastructure providers – collaborating to ensure 
that data is accessible and usable. This enables the market players to extract value from 
this data, such as by creating applications for traffic management or for optimising 
harvesting.”235  
The reason for building a data economy is that digital data is recognised as an essential resource for 
economic growth, competitiveness, innovation, job creation and societal progress in general. This 
means that in order to enable the DSM, the flow of this resource (data) must be able to flow freely 
across national borders and industrial sectors. Data should be made reusable to the stakeholders.236 
In January 2017, the Commission adopted a communication on “Building a European Data Economy” 
alongside with a staff working document, where it discusses some preliminary key issues regarding 
access to and transfer of data. Predominantly, the communication and the staff working document 
discusses that some of the main concerns for the Data Economy is the access to and interoperability 
of the data, as well as issues of ownership and transferability in relation to the data generated by 
machines and processes. These concerns are of central to the emergence of a data economy, and the 
aspect of competition law issues is not discussed.237  
                                                          
232 Ian Traynor, EU unveils plans to set up digital single market for online firms, The Guardian, 6 May 2015, 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/may/06/eu-unveils-plans-digital-single-market-online-firms 
(accessed 28 February 2017) 
233 European Commission, Digital Single Market, published 25 March, 2015, last updated 11 July 2017, 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/digital-single-market (accessed 13 July 2017) 
234 ibid 
235 Quoted in full from ibid  
236 ibid 
237 See section 1 and 3 in “building a European data economy”; also, neither does the accompanying Staff Working 
Document discuss this.  
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In light of the findings of this thesis, it seems that the tendency of data to aggregate into large but few 
collections rather than to fragment into several but few collections, is a tendency that the Union’s 
competition law cannot affect in its current guise. The fact that this tendency is found to not be a 
competition problem per se, by me, could indicate that the enabling of the European Data Economy 
does not require any intervention in regards of the merger review system. It does however still seem 
counterintuitive that the envisioned Data Economy is compatible with natural monopolies of data, as 
the core idea of the Data Economy is the free flow of data between actors and not its coalescence into 
the hands of the few.  
7.3.2. Competition law and politics, revisited 
Where traditional industries are comprised of value chains of several actors, the digital industry is 
instead characterised by the interactions between a single supplier/content provider and the end-
consumers. As consumers are attracted to the best consumer experience, which in turn could be one 
of the most important uses of data – to improve the user experience – feedback loops where big gets 
bigger are a logical consequence.238 
As shown in the thesis, there is little discernible difference in the innovative output of a concentrated 
market vis á vis a fragmented. Therefore, the question arises if the natural oligopoly we can expect to 
remain should be broken up by the use of competition law. The current competition policy of the 
European Union does not allow for such enforcement, but for the sake of argument, some alternative 
avenues of consumer harm could be considered. Below I present what I find to be ideas worth 
considering: 
Firstly, one of the more frightening developments during the last years have been the phenomenon of 
“filter bubbles” and notion of “fake news” or “alternative facts”. A filter bubble means that people live 
inside their own bubbles of information fed to them by their respective Facebook feeds and 
personalised Google search result pages. An example of this would be two persons that live next door 
to each but gets differing news and information about what is going on in their shared society.239 Filter 
bubbles are often mentioned in discussions concerning politics and elections (and the existence of 
“fake news”),240 and could pose a serious threat to the democratic societies of Europe as we know 
them. The safeguarding of democracy could very well be a policy attribute worth considering in a 
politicised competition law.  
Secondly, one should consider for how long time the ingenuity of innovation that put a company in a 
leading position can serve as an argument for it remaining there. Is it the lifetime of the founders? Is 
it for as long as the company is a relevant innovator in its field? The logic behind the question is similar 
to that of the ship of Theseus: what part of the company contains the component which shields it from 
critical competitive assessment? 
                                                          
238 For more information of the notion of “aggregation theory”, see here: Ben Thompson, Aggregation Theory, 
Stratechery [blog], 21 July 2015, https://stratechery.com/2015/aggregation-theory/ (accessed 7 July 2017) 
239 Filter bubbles have been described in inter alia: Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society – The secret algorithms 
that control money and information, Harvard University Press, First Harvard University Press paper back edition, 
second printing, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2016, p. 79  
240 See for instance here: Jasper Jackson, Eli Pariser: activist whose filter bubble warnings presaged Trump and 
Brexit, The Guardian [online], 8 January 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/jan/08/eli-pariser-
activist-whose-filter-bubble-warnings-presaged-trump-and-brexit (accessed on 1 July 2017) 
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Thirdly, which might probably be the most provocative consideration, is how much Europe should 
safeguard its own regional economic interests against foreign companies that does not pay taxes 
within Europe that correspond with the profit they generate there. This might be cause to consider a 
political agenda less concerned with enabling the integrated internal market, and more concerned with 
asking what the benefits for the member states of the Union are. 
As we can see, competition law and policy is rife with questions concerning legal-technical issues, 
innovation, economics, society, and even philosophy and ethics. It is my hope that this thesis has 
helped outline the nature of the questions facing competition policy, and maybe even suggested some 
plausible answers to them.  
7.4. Suggestion for future research  
The most interesting question encountered in this thesis, which due to limitations in time and scope 
was not possible to pursue, was the question of how the doctrine of hypothetical markets developed 
in Magill, IMS Health, and Microsoft could be transposed into the sphere of market definitions 
warranted by a merger review – or is this approach restricted to the sphere of abuse of dominance. 
This question could be connected with the role of indirect constraints in relation to data: if indirect 
constraints should be considered exclusively in the assessment of market power, or if they can also be 
considered when defining the relevant market?241 This thesis has largely dealt with indirect constraints 
in both parts of the analysis, and the results could therefore easily be “disrupted” if the feasibility of a 
hypothetical market for data as input where to be refuted. 
  
                                                          
241 For an introduction to the problem, see here: CRA International, report for Ofcom: Indirect Constraints and 
Captive Sales, 3 May 2006, online, available here 
http://ecp.crai.com/publications/Indirect_constraints_and_captive_sales.pdf (accessed 12 July 2017), pp. 4-8 
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Appendix 1 - The economical properties of data and the markets 
for it 
As mentioned in 3.3 (The characteristics of data), the key concepts necessary for understanding data 
as an economic resource will be discussed in further depth, here. Since data as a resource displays 
several economic properties that are dissimilar from traditional physical objects, on which trade has 
historically relied, the competition analysis concerning data must be based on a reasonable 
understanding of the dynamics at play in the interaction between data, organisation, and end-user. 
Data is a non-rival goods 
“Factors of production” is an economic term that describes the inputs that are used in the production 
of goods or services in order to make an economic profit.242 Data as an input for production is in theory 
different from other capital factors of production such as raw material and machinery, as data can be 
used as an input factor (and also outputted) over and over again without depleting it or destroying its 
source, and it can be used for different purposed simultaneously. This property is known as non-
rivalry.243 An industrial machine on the other hand can only be used to output one product at a time, 
and over time it will need maintenance and repairs – thus depreciating.  
This means that more than one actor can collect the same data without affecting the other actors, who 
have already collected the same data – for instance the home address of a customer. Therefore, 
metaphors such as data being the “oil” of the digital economy becomes ill suited, as oil contrary to 
data is a highly rival economic input.244  
In practice, the value of data is dependent on the context and capabilities of the agent controlling it. 
As an example, a list of customers whose electricity supply agreements are near the point in time in 
which they are either prolonged or re-negotiated is more valuable in the hands of someone who can 
offer the customers alternative electricity plans, than in the hands of for instance a hair dresser.  
There are acquisition costs of data which modulates the value of the non-rivalry of the data: if the 
acquisition cost is low, the non-rivalry aspect of the data becomes less valuable, but if the investment 
made in obtaining the data is significant, the capability to use the data in non-rivalrous ways become 
more important.245 As a simplistic example: observing the weather at one’s immediate location and 
informing the people in the vicinity of the current meteorological conditions is not very useful, as they 
have immediate access to the same information and can retrieve it without cost or effort; however, if 
instead one has observational stations spread across a large geographical area, and the aggregated 
weather data is sold to e.g. an airport, the ability to sell it to other interested parties in addition to the 
airport is of greater value than in the first case. The fact that the information can be used several times 
simultaneously is of no use when everyone can just as well access the information themselves.  
                                                          
242 Investopedia, Factors of Production, 2017 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/factors-production.asp   
(accessed 4 March 2017) 
243 The initial proposal of viewing knowledge as a non-rival goods come from Dominique Foray, as discussed in 
ch. 5 of his book: Dominique Foray, Economics of Knowledge, Cambridge Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2004 
244 For a discussion about metaphors for data, see Kuneva; Haupt; OECD: supra 84  
245 This idea is originally formulated in in regards of knowledge, not data: Foray, pp. 98-99  
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This leads to a pricing difficulty of data: there has been considerable expenses made to overcome the 
initial cost of obtaining the information, and to the extent that these cannot be covered by the price 
of the initial version the data, the costs of obtaining it becomes sunk costs which cannot be recovered 
by the sale of subsequent copies it the data. Therefore, the it becomes crucial for the organisation 
owning the data to have control over allowing access to the data. This fact makes it impossible for 
markets for data to look like textbook perfect competitive markets in which there are many suppliers 
offering similar products.246  
As for data collected from customers, such as for instance their name and address, the data is non-
rival and the same data can be collected by many different actors at the same time. One could think 
that this fact makes it harder for an undertaking to gain a dominant position,247 as the data as a source 
of competitive advantage cannot be protected by the company. As we will see in the following sections, 
the situation is more complex than that. 
Economies of scale 
Economies of scale (or returns to scale) is a cost advantage that arises with increased output of a 
product. Generally, as more units of a product is outputted, the cost of building them are spread out 
on a larger number. Similarly, the operational efficiency can be increased as the scale of the operation 
is enlarged. A simple example is comparison of effort and man-hours it takes a hobbyist to build a car 
from scratch in the garage, opposed to the time it takes a modern manufacturing plant – the former 
has no positive effects from economies of scale, whereas the latter is engineered to benefit as most as 
possible from it.  
There are many potential sources of economies of scale, e.g. the input can only be acquired in large 
discrete quantities (and a big company makes use of it all), or as the size of an operation increases 
there may be scope for a more efficient allocation of resources within the firm resulting in cost 
savings.248  
If thought of as a graph, the costs of production go down with an increase of volume, but at some point 
this curve inflects and the cost of production starts increasing as the volume of production increases 
(a hair dressing salon with a very large number of hair dressers would find itself in need of a HR-
specialist, amongst other things). This U-shaped graph determines the optimal size of the company. If 
the point of inflection is very far away it means that the optimal size of the firm is that of very large 
operations, which leads to the generation of natural monopolies.249  
When there are economies of scale effects present, the minimum efficient size of a firm may be big 
relative to the size of the market, meaning that there will be few active firms in that market. If the size 
needed to achieve efficiency is so large that a company becomes the only undertaking operating on 
the market, a natural monopoly is at hand. In practical terms, undertakings can make benefit from the 
                                                          
246 Shapiro and Varian, pp. 22-23 
247 In the American BAR Association’s journal for antitrust issues the authors argues that it is implausible for a 
company to have market power in respect to big data. One must remember that their arguments belong in an 
American antitrust context, but they do provide a sound critique of competition concerns regarding data: Darren 
S. Tucker and Hill B. Wellford, ‘Big Mistakes Regarding Big Data’, The Antitrust Source, December 2014, vol. 14, 
no. 2, p. 12 
248 Davis and Garcés, p. 29 
249 Davis and Garcés, pp. 123-124 
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barriers to entry caused by the economies of scale at play by using market prices far above the cost of 
production, to the end-consumers’ detriment, but the companies can also simply be highly efficient 
producers. To break up such a monopoly would have negative effects on the productive efficiency, but 
on the other hand remove any unjustified pricing power of the undertaking.250 Therefore, this implies 
that a trade-off between overall economic efficiency and consumer benefit must be made.251  
In the world of digital platforms, the marginal cost of production and distribution of content (data) is 
as good as zero, whereas the platform itself requires a significant investment to establish as it requires 
complex software development, and also a means of reaching out to one or more of the intended 
customer groups (i.e. marketing and branding). Therefore, the economies of scale in digital platforms 
leads to an increase in size and concentration of existing companies competing in the same market.252 
When there is a connection between software and hardware – as in the case of computers, where 
software is dedicated for use on either Windows and Apple computers – positive feedback loops 
emerge from the connection between a user-base for the hardware, and availability of software for it. 
Due to factors such as learning-by-doing, the software for the given hardware will enjoy economies of 
scale.253 
The positive feedback loop created by the software/hardware interaction is a highly interesting 
phenomenon, as it translates into many aspects of the digital economy. One such example is the 
division between apps that can operate on Apple products versus apps that operate on the Android 
operating system. As the need for able software developers in the future will increase exponentially, 
both companies are trying to influence as many budding developers as possible to choose their 
respective coding languages for the developers to build their careers on. This proficiency in one 
language will not only help increase the range of interoperable products within the given ecosystem 
and thus attract more developers due to the economic incentives of being in the larger market, but 
also creates lock-in effects for the developers as they become increasingly proficient in their chosen 
language. If the Apple/Android markets are viewed as 2SPs (developers/customers), the positive 
feedback effects on one side (the developers) will reinforce the feedback effects on the other side (see 
0 Network effects and multi-sided markets, and more).  
Economies of scope 
Efficiencies of scope are similar to economies of scale, with the difference that it is variety and not 
volume that generates the positive effect. It has been the underpinning idea that has motivated 
companies to diversify themselves which led to the large international conglomerates seen in the 70’s 
and 80’s.254 
Companies which expand their data collection and analytics into adjacent areas (as discussed above) 
can reap benefits from being able to perform joint analysis of the existing and additional data, which 
                                                          
250 Davis and Garcés, pp. 29 and 124  
251 Again, the question of what to weigh into this trade-off becomes interesting: supra 74.  
252 David S. Evans, Richard Schmalensee, ‘The industrial organisation of markets with two-sided platforms’, 
National bureau of economic research working paper series, 2005, p. 15 
253 Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, ‘Systems Competition and Network Effects’, The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Spring, 1994), p. 94 
254 Economies of scale and scope, The Economist [online], 20 October 2008, 
http://www.economist.com/node/12446567 (accessed 6 March 2017) 
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other actors have that have to separately analyse data in a particular area.255 This would thus prove an 
example of economies of scope.  
Just like with economies of scale, the overall economic efficiency increases when data is processed 
centrally, but also when new sets of data are synthesised from two or more existing sets. For 
consumers, this might mean a broader range of products available and a source of new innovation. 
Network effects and multi-sided markets, and more  
A network effect is the effect that a user of a product or service has on the value 
of product or service for other people. A common example of how network 
effects work is that of the telephone: investing in a telephone connection has 
little value if there are only a few other users connected to the network – if on 
the other hand more people have telephones, the chances that you can reach 
your intended recipient is greater, as is the pressure on the remaining people 
not yet having invested in a telephone to do so, as they are missing out on the 
positive effects of being part of the network.256  
Network effects are not an inherent characteristic in data itself, as non-rivalry 
is, but given the fact that network effects are often based on the communication 
of information or data and that they are such an important aspect of the 
competition in data markets, it will be discussed at some length here. 
The theory of network effects is relevant both to the organisations that deal 
with data, and how data as a competitive advantage works. For a company 
that offers a product or service, such as a communications network or a dating 
venue, the value of their product or service for the customer increases with 
the number of already existing customers. For data used as a competitive 
advantage, the more data you add to the set you already have or complement it with, the more 
inductions and deductions you can make – in consequence making the existing data more valuable as 
more data is added to it.  
A multi-sided market is where an undertaking is active towards more than one group of customers at 
the same time. This is not an uncommon strategy for companies to employ when offering services over 
the internet, as the use of a service can be offered for “free” to one customer group whereas it is in 
fact subsidised by the services bought by another customer group.257 Two such examples of this are 1) 
Google, who offers a free to use search service (alongside with many other free functions), where 
advertisers can buy “sponsored” search results – the quality of a bought search result is thus connected 
to the number of people using the search service;258 and 2) Facebook, who offers a free online 
                                                          
255 As discussed under the notion of ”concentric diversification” in: Bertin Martins, An Economic Policy 
Perspective on Online Platforms, Institute for prospective technological studies digital economy working paper 
2016/05, pp. 36-37. 
256 Katz and Shapiro, pp. 93-115 
257 This article proposes a model for explaining two-sided network externalities, building upon the findings 
presented by Katz and Shapiro: Geoffrey G. Parker and Marshall W. Van Alstyne, ‘Two-Sided Network Effects: A 
Theory of Information Product Design’, Management Science, Vol. 51, No. 10 (Oct., 2005), pp. 1494-1504 
258 “Google Adwords” is Google’s biggest revenue generator. For more knowledge on the financial peculiarities 
of the company, this article provides a good picture of how strong a money maker the Adwords product is: Max 
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networking community, where companies can also pay for their advertising to be seen – the data 
gathered from the users’ profiles and behaviour is used to tailor what advertising they see, thus 
enabling the advertiser to more accurately reach its intended audience. 
Digital platforms 
A platform can be many things, such as a business platform (a multisided market), a software platform 
(a cloud-based subscription service), or an engagement platform (a user-generated community).259 A 
platform can also combine several functions.  
A two-sided platform (“2SP”) caters to two or more distinctive groups of customers, and many diverse 
things can be described with this economic theory (first proposed in 1983) such as dating services and 
cash. In a seminal paper from 2003, Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole showed how a number of 
modern businesses could be considered 2SPs, and that they often found it profitable to offer services 
to one customer group at a price possibly lower than the margin cost for it – i.e. one customer group 
subsidises the other group’s use of the service.260 
A digital platform can be defined as a technological basis for delivering multiple products or services, 
and which mediates between the end-users and the providers of the products and services.261 One 
example of a kind of platform is for instance Google’ “Play Store” and Apple’s “App store”, which both 
connects device users with creators of apps to be used on the devices. One of the apps procured using 
an app store could then itself be a platform, connecting for instance male and female users with each 
other for dating purposes. All platforms have in common that they are influenced by network effects.  
A digital platform can operate on many venues (for instance an operating system such as Android in 
both a smartphone and in a television), and also be stacked on top of each other (for instance an 
Android phone hosting both Google’s “Play Store” and Samsung’s “Galaxy Apps”. When such stacking 
of the platforms and their value chains occur, it can be said to result in “value webs”, which are multiple 
interlinked value chains that have converged into a web of services and assets.262 These value webs 
are not to be confused with the ecosystem described in 3.2 (The big data value chain) – if stacked 
vertically where the bottom represents the physical infrastructure for the internet, these services are 
very close to the “top”. 
When looking at the interactions of digital platforms, they are strongly characterised by the influence 
of network effects, while at the same time new competing entrants have plenty of potential entry 
points to compete with the offerings of the incumbents. This puts a considerable pressure on the 
                                                          
Chafkin, Mark Bergen, ‘Google Makes So Much Money, It Never Had to Worry About Financial Discipline—Until 
Now’, Bloomberg Businessweek, 8 December 2016. Available here 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2016-12-08/google-makes-so-much-money-it-never-had-to-
worry-about-financial-discipline [accessed 5 March 2017].  
259 Mark Bonchek, Barry Libert, You Don’t Need to Be a Silicon Valley Startup to Have a Network-Based Strategy, 
Harvard Business Review [online], 14 July 2017, https://hbr.org/2017/07/you-dont-need-to-be-a-silicon-valley-
startup-to-have-a-network-based-strategy?utm_campaign=hbr&utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=social 
(accessed 15 July 2017) 
260 For a crisp background of the term, see: Evans and Schmalensee p. 2; which references: Rochet and Tirole, 
pp. 990-991 
261 Policy department A (economic and scientific policy), Challenges for competition policy in a digitalised 




incumbents to keep innovating themselves to secure their leading position, but leading firms also have 
much to gain from innovating, as it offers them the opportunity to enter into new markets whilst still 
enjoying benefits from network effects caused by synergies between the original and new offering. 
Consequently, this can prove to be a gap that is not possible to bridge, much like one can never grow 
chronologically older than one’s older siblings due to their head start.  
A consequence of the pressure to innovate is that the boundaries of the market are constantly being 
re-defined, in terms of consumer offering, while the important input and output of the market – data 
– remains more or less the same. Regardless if one uses Uber’s services to transport oneself or to order 
food, or to learn more about the local traffic conditions, one discloses personal data in relation to one’s 
capacity as a moving object. 
Multi-homing263 
Multi-homing is a term that has become used in the recent discussion about data and competition 
policy, and denotes when consumers use several providers to get the same service.264 An example of 
this would a consumer that has simultaneous subscriptions to for instance both Netflix’ and HBO 
Nordic’s services. 
The impact of multi-homing on competition among digital platforms is hard to fully understand, as 
many factors are included in the analysis. On the on hand, “perfect” multi-homing will be rather rare 
due to switching costs such as loss of network effects and learning new systems, but on the other hand, 
when products and services are offered for free to customers the competition for the multi-homing 
customers becomes contingent on the quality of the offering and thus more likely to switch as they 
see fit. Furthermore, the level of multi-homing may vary among different groups of customers that all 
use the same multisided platform.  
As a practical consideration in regards of the constraints of multi-homing, one have to look at how 
often the product or service in question is needed by the consumer. Entertainment in the form of 
digital content is consumed in large quantities, whereas the regular consumer can only be expected to 
buy so many shoes per year. Therefore, the conditions for multi-homing when shopping for online 
entertainment are better than those for shoes, as the latter consumer choice is not made as often as 
the former.  
In all, for multi-homing to make a difference in a competitive analysis, the consumers must multi-home 
to a rather high degree – something which is not entirely plausible to expect on the market.265 These 
doubts about the impact of multi-homing have been affirmed by the Commission in the 
Microsoft/LinkedIn merger decision.266 
Snowballing: positive feedback loops 
With data, one of its uses is that it can be used to improve existing offerings. For instance, the service 
of web searches can be improved by analysing all searches conducted to see what results seems the 
most relevant for certain search strings, and then promoting those results for subsequent searches 
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made. The more searches are being made, the better the search engine becomes – which can be 
expected to attract more people to use it. This can lead to self-reinforcing effects which fixes market 
structures in place: big actors become bigger, and small actors have difficulties with reaching the 
critical mass necessary to grow in such a way that they can compete with larger incumbents. The gaps 
and differences between companies only grow larger with time.  
The higher revenues earned by larger undertakings could in turn provide them the necessary resources 
to enter into adjacent markets, which could very well share synergies with the already existing network 
effects enjoyed, thus leading towards a convergence into monopolisation of data-related markets.  
It has been argued267 that when equilibrium is reached in markets influenced by network effects, the 
point of equilibrium will diverge from the social optimum due to two reasons: 1) due to economies of 
scale and product differentiation, these markets are often characterized by oligopoly or monopolistic 
competition, which is less desirable than perfect competition; and 2) the markets become volatile, due 
to the importance of R&D and innovation – one monopoly could quickly be replaced by another.268  
As a perspective, it is possible to argue that the allocation of property rights to knowledge (which in 
this regard can be viewed as being interchangeable with data) can retard rather than stimulate 
innovations when the value of knowledge/data is cumulative and/or the field is characterised by strong 
network externalities.269 Whilst the granting of IPR-styled protection of data as an asset is not on the 
table, it underlines the notion that concentration and “siloing” of data is undesirable – a sentiment 
also expressed by the Commission.270 
Appendix 2 – Data in a practical business law setting  
In line with the somewhat nebulous quality of data in the world of academia, there is no clear legal 
definition of data nor big data either, but that does not mean that data cannot at all be managed using 
legal tools. Before describing how data can be managed, I will first describe in what sense big data has 
been left the “legal orphan” in the world of law. The importance of controlling data and its impact on 
competition in regards of innovation would sort under the notion of appropriability. The purpose with 
this appendix is to show why acquisitions can be a more viable option for a company to gain access to 
data, than “licensing” it would be, and how effects on competition may arise from the design of the 
rules in a seemingly unrelated field of law. 
When the Database Directive (96/9/EC) was implemented it created a sui generis type of protection 
for databases, built upon the model of copyright. It states (art. 7.1) that Member States shall provide 
protection for the maker of a database, if there has been a qualitatively or quantitatively substantial 
investment in either obtaining, verifying or presenting the contents (my emphasis). In subsequent case 
law, a substantial investment has come to mean the resources spent in finding existing data and adding 
them to the database, and not the resources spent in creating the contents of a database.271 This 
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74 
 
means that what is colloquially referred to as big data as of today fails to qualify as a legally protected 
database under the Database Directive, as it is most likely that a substantial investment has been made 
to generate the data inside the frame of the business operation, rather than finding and structuring 
existing data. Of course, examples of the latter do exist but rather serves as exceptions that underline 
the main rule: for example, the multinational company Bisnode’s commercial offering consists of 
aggregated information from public documents;272 and the legal database Karnov’s commercial 
offering consists of searchable legal documents that have been obtained from all of the courts in 
Sweden.273 A more conventional way of collecting data is by using automated “crawlers” on the web, 
which are computer programs that are used to index the content of the web with differing foci, such 
as for instance the content of one particular site, or the content of all daily news sites. Constructing 
and maintaining such a crawler does not constitute a substantial investment according to the Database 
Directive, but the amount of data that is gathered with it can be enormous.274 
After having just stated that web-crawling is reasonably easy to get started with, and not deemed as a 
substantial investment for creating a database, it cannot go without mentioning that Google’s search 
engine operates precisely on this principle: Google indexes the entire internet, constantly, using their 
crawlers.275 How Google have kept this information – and the algorithm to search it with - to 
themselves is not by using any formal legal protection per se, but from the use of strict routines 
regarding trade secrets which can be sanctioned with contract stipulations and trade secrets law.276 
In Europe, trade secrets are defined as information which meets three cumulative requirements: 1) 
the information is secret and not generally known or readily accessible; 2) the information has a 
commercial value because it is a secret; and 3) it has been subject to reasonable steps to be kept 
secret.277 This kind of definition serves companies well, who generate and collect information to be 
used and kept within the confines of the business operation, but is limited to a very small scale of trade 
and disclosure (in the form of partnerships, joint ventures and the similar) as a trade secret cannot be 
readily sold in a marketplace or similar solution due to this being in conflict with the requirements of 
the Trade Secrets Directive.  
Picking up on the discussion of how to view data, mentioned earlier, data can also from a pragmatic 
legal perspective be seen as a commodity. In the Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere 
joint venture decision, the Commission mentioned that “customers generally tend to give their 
personal data to many market players, which gather and market it. Therefore, this type of data is 
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generally understood to be a commodity”.278 One should be mindful that this assessment was made 
within the frame of a competition law analysis, which looks only at the effects of the conduct in 
question, and carries no formal weight as an argument regarding the status of data in other legal fields. 
Nevertheless, the statement indicates that data serves an important function in the contemporary 
economy. 
The commonly used method when data is being transacted is to draft elaborate contracts that are 
modelled on a IP-license chassis, but with the necessary changes made to accommodate the lack of 
supporting regulation in case of conflict or lack of clarity. This means that questions such as data 
ownership, allowed use of data, ownership of generated data and suchlike must be stipulated for every 
contract. A consequence of this is that specialised legal expertise is required in order to draft the 
necessary contracts, thus creating a substantial transaction cost that might deter actors from entering 
into data trade agreements with each other. The Commission argues that this might lead to unevenly 
balanced standard contracts being used, creating undesired lock-in effects of data.279  
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